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IMPACT OF LOGISTICS ON READINESS AND LIFE CYCLE 
COST: 





Operational commanders are concerned with maintaining an optimal operational 
availability (Ao) for their weapons systems while balancing with readiness risk 
(probability of not achieving a threshold Ao), and cost.  Operational availability 
has been integrated in the acquisition process (Department of Defense, 2009), 
affecting decision making to a great extent.  In the early phase of an acquisition, 
an initial Ao threshold is created to support mission requirements.  The initial Ao 
threshold is used in performance- based contracts in order to reduce the buyers’ 
risk and the total life cycle cost (TLCC).  
Utilizing logistics modeling, cost analysis, a test platform, which is the 
Light Armored Vehicle equipped with a 25mm Gun System (LAV-25) currently 
employed by the United States Marine Corps (USMC), the authors will determine 
the effects of logistics on Ao and the TLCC utilizing specific critical factors, such 
as mean time between maintenance (MTBM), mean down time (MDT), and 
operational tempo.  The authors' research will show which of the Ao’s synthetic 
parameters are more sensitive to maintaining specific levels of Ao and readiness 
risk in conjunction with the cost, and the authors will suggest alternatives to 
achieve Ao and readiness risk thresholds under specific cost constraints.   
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
A. BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 1 
B. PURPOSE ............................................................................................ 1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION ...................................................................... 3 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................... 3 
1.  Scope ........................................................................................ 3 
2. Methodology ............................................................................ 4 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ............................................................... 4 
II. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 7 
A. USMC MAINTENANCE PROGRAM .................................................... 7 
1. Introduction .............................................................................. 7 
2. Description of Maintenance Categories ................................ 7 
a. Organizational Maintenance ........................................ 7 
b. Intermediate Maintenance ............................................ 7 
c. Depot Maintenance ....................................................... 8 
3. Description of Echelons of Maintenance ............................... 8 
a. 1st Echelon .................................................................... 8 
b. 2nd Echelon ................................................................... 8 
c. 3rd Echelon ................................................................... 9 
d. 4th Echelon .................................................................... 9 
e. 5th Echelon .................................................................. 10 
B. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY (AO) ................................................ 10 
1. Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) .................................. 12 
2. Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) ................................................ 12 
3. Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT) ...................................... 13 
4. Operation Availability in Acquisition and Readiness Risk . 15 
C. LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC) ................................................................. 16 
III. METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................... 19 
A. BASELINE ......................................................................................... 19 
B. ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................. 20 
C. MODELS ............................................................................................ 22 
1. Arena Simulation Model ........................................................ 23 
2. Excel Spreadsheet Model ..................................................... 27 
D.  DATA GATHERING ........................................................................... 27 
E. LIMITATIONS .................................................................................... 30 
F. APPLICATION ................................................................................... 30 
IV. LOGISTIC IMPACT INTO ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT .......................... 31 
A. INTEGRATED DEFENSE ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
LOGISTICS LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ........................ 31 
B. PERFORMANCE-BASED LOGISTICS ............................................. 35 
 viii 
C. THE ROLE OF MODELING AND SIMULATION IN PBL/ LAV-25 
CASE ................................................................................................. 46 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 48 
V. LAV-25 CASE STUDY: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ............................. 51 
A.  BASELINE CASE .............................................................................. 52 
B. PART ONE – CASE ONE (4TH ECHELON TAT N(45, 4.5)) ............. 58 
C. PART ONE – CASE TWO (4TH ECHELON TAT N(30, 4.5)) ............ 60 
D. PART ONE – CASE THREE (INCREASE NUMBER OF SPARES 
IN THE SPARE INVENTORY: N(15, 1.2) SPARES FOR 
COMPONENT 1 OR COMPONENT 5) .............................................. 61 
E. ASSESSMENT FOR PART ONE (CASES ONE THROUGH 
THREE): IMPROVE TAT VERSUS INCREASE THE NUMBER OF 
SPARES IN INVENTORY .................................................................. 67 
F. PART TWO – CASE FOUR (DEMAND IMPROVED FAILURE 
RATE FOR COMPONENT 1 OR FOR ALL THE FIVE 
COMPONENTS)................................................................................. 73 
G. PART TWO – CASE FIVE (LOWER FAILURE RATE FOR 
CRITICAL COMPONENTS IN COMBINATION WITH CASE 
THREE) .............................................................................................. 77 
H. ASSESSMENT FOR PART TWO (CASES FOUR AND FIVE): 
PROCURE LOWER FAILURE RATES IN CRITICAL 
COMPONENTS .................................................................................. 82 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 87 
A. MOTIVATION ..................................................................................... 87 
B. OVERVIEW ........................................................................................ 88 
C. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 91 
D. IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................. 93 
1. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
& Logistics ............................................................................. 93 
2. Acquisition Managers / Decision Makers (Agencies, 
Boards, PMs) .......................................................................... 94 
3. Contracting Officers .............................................................. 95 
4. Maintenance and Logistics Managers ................................. 96 
5. Warfighter ............................................................................... 96 
6. Taxpayers ............................................................................... 97 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................... 97 
APPENDIX:  LAV-25 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ...................................................... 99 
A. PROGRAM HISTORY ........................................................................ 99 
B. CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTIONS ............................................... 100 
LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................ 103 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 107 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Operational Availability (Ao) Components .......................................... 14 
Figure 2. Life Cycle Cost Category Definitions (From: Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 2010) ............................................................................... 16 
Figure 3. Vicious Cycle ...................................................................................... 23 
Figure 4. The Repair Cycle ................................................................................ 24 
Figure 5. LAV-25 Arena Simulation Model (After: Kang et al., 2009) ................. 25 
Figure 6. A Screen Shot of Excel Input-Output Spreadsheet ............................ 26 
Figure 7. A Screen Shot of the LCC Excel Spreadsheet Model (After: Kang et 
al., 2009) ............................................................................................ 29 
Figure 8. Life Cycle Logistics Overview (From: Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 2010) ............................................................................... 32 
Figure 9. Total Ownership Cost (From: Hardy, 2007) ........................................ 36 
Figure 10. R-TOC Pilot Programs Savings/Benefits (From: Pallas, 2002) ........... 40 
Figure 11. Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for the Baseline Case ........ 54 
Figure 12. LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for the Baseline Case ..... 55 
Figure 13. Ao's Quantiles and the Cumulative Operational Availability for the 
Baseline Case .................................................................................... 56 
Figure 14. Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case One ..................... 58 
Figure 15. Ao's Quantiles and the Cumulative Operational Availability for Case 
One ..................................................................................................... 59 
Figure 16. Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Two ..................... 60 
Figure 17. Ao's Quantiles and the Cumulative Operational Availability for Case 
Two ..................................................................................................... 61 
Figure 18. Values of Input Parameters for Case Three ....................................... 62 
Figure 19. Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Three (Increase 
Number of Spares: N(15, 1.2) in the Spare 1 and Spare 5 
Inventories) ......................................................................................... 63 
Figure 20. Ao's Quantiles and the Cumulative Operational Availability for Case 
Three .................................................................................................. 64 
Figure 21. LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Three 
(Increase Number of Spares: N(15, 1.2) in the Spare 1 or Spare 5 
Inventory) ........................................................................................... 66 
Figure 22. Ao Distribution Case Comparison for Part One .................................. 68 
Figure 23. Ao Distribution Chart – Case Comparison for Part One ..................... 69 
Figure 24. Readiness Risk Chart - Case Comparison for Part One ..................... 71 
Figure 25. LCC Distribution Chart – Case Comparison for Part One ................... 72 
Figure 26. Ao Descriptive Statistics for Case Four Sub-cases ............................ 73 
Figure 27. Ao Distribution Charts for Case Four Sub-cases ................................ 74 
Figure 28. Readiness Risk for Case Four Sub-cases .......................................... 75 
Figure 29. LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Four Sub-
cases .................................................................................................. 76 
Figure 30. Ao Distribution Charts for Case Five Sub-cases ................................ 78 
 x 
Figure 31. Ao Descriptive Statistics for Case Five Sub-cases ............................. 79 
Figure 32. Readiness Risk Chart for Case Five Sub-cases ................................. 79 
Figure 33. Readiness Risk for Case Five Sub-cases .......................................... 80 
Figure 34. LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Five Sub-cases 81 
Figure 35. Ao Distribution Chart – Comparison for Part Two ............................... 83 
Figure 36. Readiness Risk Chart – Cases Comparison for Part Two .................. 84 
Figure 37. LCC Distribution Chart – Cases Comparison for Part Two ................. 85 
Figure 38. LAV-25 (From: Olive-Drab, n.d.) ....................................................... 101 
 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. LAV-25 Part Usage............................................................................. 21 
Table 2. PBL Supported Weapon System Programs [After: (Product Support 
for the 21st Century: a Program Manager’s Guide to Buying 
Performance, 2001),  (Performance Based Logistics: A Product 
Manager's Product Support Guide, 2005),  (Government 
Accountability Office, 2008)] ............................................................... 39 
Table 3. PBL Availability Benefits  (After: Fowler, 2008) .................................. 44 
Table 4. PBL Cost Benefit  (After: Fowler, 2008) .............................................. 45 
Table 5. Values of Input Parameters for Baseline Case ................................... 52 
Table 6. Expected Frequency of Component Failure Rates ............................. 53 
Table 7. Input Values for the Excel Spreadsheet Model ................................... 54 
Table 8. Input–Output Values Correlation ........................................................ 57 
Table 9. Readiness Risk Assessment Table for Part One ................................ 70 
Table 10. Summary of Cases ............................................................................. 90 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Ai  Inherent Availability 
Ao  Operational Availability 
ARROWS Aviation Retail Requirements Oriented to Weapon Replaceable 
Assemblies 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoDD  DoD Directive 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
IROAN Inspect and Repair As Necessary 
KPP  Key Performance Parameters 
LAV  Light Armored Vehicle 
LCC  Life Cycle Cost 
MadmDT Mean Administrative Delay Time 
MC  Maintenance Center 
MCDSS:  Marine Corps Decision Support System  
MCLB  Marine Corps Logistic Base 
MDAPs Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
MLDT  Mean Logistics Delay Time 
MMT  Mean Maintenance Time 
MOADT Mean Outside Assistance Delay Time 
MRAP  Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
MSRT  Mean Supply Response Time 
MTBF  Mean Time between Failures 
MTMB Mean Time between Maintenance 
 xiv 
MTTR  Mean Time to Repair 
M&S  Modeling and Simulation 
O&S  Operational and Support 
Op-Tempo Operational Tempo 
PBA  Performance-Based Agreements 
PBL  Performance-Based Logistics 
PM  Program Manager 
PPBE  Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review 
RBS  Readiness Based Sparing 
RCM  Reliability Centered Maintenance 
RFI  Ready-for-Issue 
R-TOC Reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
R&D  Research and Development 
SBCT  Stryker Brigade Combat Teams 
SECREPS Secondary Repairables 
SOW  Statement of Work 
TLCSM Total Life Cycle Systems Management 
TOC  Total Ownership Cost 
UK MOD United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 
USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics) 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The authors would like to thank Professors Keebom Kang Dr. and E. Cory 
Yoder for their patience and support during the research and writing of this MBA 
report, as well as their dialog, enthusiasm and passion for the subject.  We will 
certainly take with us all of what we have learned from you through the rest of our 
lives. 
I would like to express my gratitude to my loving wife, Pavlina, and my 
wonderful kids, son Nikolas and daughter Diony; thank you for your 
understanding and support through the years, especially the last 18 months.  I 
love you.  To my close friend Stavros, I have known him for 21 years and I am 
proud for having such a friend.  To my friend John, whom I feel that I have known 
for decades, I will never forget the passion to find solutions in our project during 
our meetings.  
– Major Andreas Balafas 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to the Hellenic Air Force for providing 
me with the unique opportunity to extend my education at the level of a master 
degree.  I would like to thank my MBA report partners and great friends Andreas 
and John, accompanied with all the best wishes for them and their beloved 
families.  Your friendship and the time we spent together is definitely one of the 
greatest gifts I earned here.  Finally, I would like to thank and express all my love 
to my wife and life companion, Maria, for her strength and unconditional support.  
This work is dedicated to you with everlasting love and respect! 





I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Rachel, and awesome children, 
Adrienne and Cameron, for their understanding and support throughout my 26-
year career, especially the last 18-months while here at the Naval Post Graduate 
School.  I know, without a shadow of a doubt, that without you guys in my life, I 
would have never made it successfully through my studies.  To my friends and 
project partners, Stavros and Andreas, without you my friends this project would 
not be the success that it is.  Each one of you has taught me a great deal and I 
appreciate your dedication, patience, and hard work.  Knowing you both has 
made me a better person, and I will miss you both greatly.  Thank you for making 
me an "Honorary Greek!" 
– Lieutenant John Stage 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continually works to shape policies to 
sustain excellence in combat effectiveness.  The ability of warfighters to 
accomplish their mission relies on personnel and weapon systems/equipment 
readiness.  The readiness measure is the operational availability (Ao).  The 
personnel readiness depends on planning, contingency planning, planning 
execution, situational awareness, and timely decisions for the best primary or 
alternative planning.  All the above depend on training and weapon 
systems/equipment readiness.  Therefore, equipment readiness is the 
fundamental factor for mission success. 
Readiness and its measure of operational availability have been 
integrated in the acquisition process, affecting decision making.  In the early 
phase of an acquisition an initial Ao threshold is created to support the mission 
requirements.  This initial Ao threshold is used in performance-based contracts in 
order to reduce the buyers’ risk and the total life cycle cost (LCC).  The 
probability a contractor will fail to deliver a desired threshold of Ao is measured 
with another metric, which is “readiness risk,” and it is associated with contract 
performance. 
B. PURPOSE 
The ability of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to fight and meet 
the demands of the National Military Strategy depends on the operational 
availability and readiness risk (probability of achieving a threshold Ao) of its 
weapon systems.  Moreover, Ao has been integrated in the acquisition process 
(Department of the Navy, 2003), which greatly affects decision making.  In the 
early phases of an acquisition, an initial Ao threshold is created to support 
mission requirements.  The initial Ao threshold is used in performance-based 
contracts in order to reduce the buyers’ risk and the total life cycle cost.  The 
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intentions of the DoD and commercial defense industries are to improve the Ao 
of weapon systems at reduced costs.  In addition, operational commanders are 
concerned with maintaining an optimal Ao for their weapons systems.  Moreover, 
they are concerned with balancing this Ao with readiness risk and cost. 
Ao depends on a system component’s reliability (failure rates), 
maintainability (e.g., repair time) of failed components, and supportability (e.g., 
transportation, administration, logistics delays).  Maintainability depends on the 
number of components’ spares in the spare pool and maintenance capacity 
(turnaround time).  Another factor that influences the Ao is operational tempo 
(Op-Tempo), which is how long (the total work time) a unit deploys or goes to the 
field. 
Utilizing logistics modeling and cost analysis techniques, this MBA report 
seeks to determine the effects of logistics on Ao and TLCC of the Light Armored 
Vehicle equipped with a 25mm Gun System (LAV-25) currently employed by the 
USMC.  The authors' research and modeling will include 76 LAV-25s normally 
deployed with a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for a life cycle of 20 years.  
For the test platform, the USMC uses 1,570 different parts in order to accomplish 
maintenance on a single LAV-25.  The purchase of all of these parts contributed 
$29,372,715 to the TLCC of the LAV-25 for the years 2007-2009.  Utilizing 
specific critical factors, such as mean time between maintenance (MTBM), mean 
down time (MDT), and Op-Tempo, the authors' research via the use of a 
simulation model will show which of the Ao’s synthetic parameters are more 
sensitive in terms of maintaining specific levels of Ao and readiness risk in 
conjunction with cost.  In addition, the research will suggest alternatives with 
optimal allocation of the critical factor to achieve Ao and readiness risk 
thresholds under specific cost constraints. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The authors' project, using a model developed with Arena simulation 
software and an Excel spreadsheet, will develop a methodology to investigate 
alternatives for Ao, LCC, and readiness risk.  In this project the authors will 
research the following questions: 
 Which logistics factors have the biggest impact on Ao, readiness 
risk, and the total life cycle cost? 
 Which combination of logistics factors is appropriate in order to find 
the optimum overall solution (meeting the minimum satisfactory 
levels of Ao, readiness risk, and total life cycle cost)? 
 What is the impact of logistics on acquisition and performance-
based logistics?  How can modeling and simulation tools be used in 
the acquisition process? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY  
1.  Scope 
This report, in terms of dollars and risk (readiness risk), will demonstrate 
which of the Ao’s component factors in a weapon system are worthy to change, 
thus, improving the system’s Ao during the life cycle management.  It examines 
two realistic options.  The first option (part one) will examine and suggest 
alternative solutions after the procurement, and during the operation and support 
(O&S) phase, into the maintainability (i.e., turnaround times during the 
maintenance) and supportability (i.e., logistics delay times during the 
administration, or the transportation, or changing the spares’ inventory), 
assuming that the components’ failures rate are given (the warfighters and the 
logistic teams cannot change these factors), as well as the Op-Tempo. The 
second option (part two) will examine and suggest alternative solutions before or 
during the system acquisition, and during the research and development (R&D) 
and investment phases, into the components reliability (i.e., during the 
procurement the acquisition team could negotiate a minimum threshold for the 
components failure rate in order to obtain a minimum Ao for a weapon’s life 
cycle). 
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2. Methodology  
This report adopts and uses an Arena simulation model and an Excel 
spreadsheet model (Kang, McDonald, Thompson, Phillips, Low, & Kim, 2009) 
that can estimate distributions of the average Ao, readiness risk, and average 
LCC for 257 scenarios for each case.  For each case, predetermined mean factor 
values will be used in accordance with the initial data and the report’s 
assumptions.  They will be generated random values (stochastic element that 
occurs during the generation of the pseudo-random numbers) in accordance with 
the factor ranges and mean values.  With the 257 scenarios for each case, the 
variable factors’ values are trying to simulate the dynamic situation of a major 
weapon system during its life operation, in peace time or under contingency 
operations.  
The initial case begins with a baseline, which became the standard 
throughout the research project.  Correlating the input data with the results the 
authors will find which of the input factors have the greater impact on Ao, 
readiness risk, and LCC.  Then the authors will try alternatives (i.e., changing the 
range value of the factors that had the greater impact) and analyze the results.  
In accordance with the sensitivity analysis and the results they will suggest 
alternative maintenance policies that will have impact on desired maintainability, 
supportability, and finally on Ao and readiness risk.  Furthermore, the authors will 
examine if an initial Ao threshold in the early phase of an acquisition process 
could be acceptable or what is the risk in accordance with the components’ 
reliability and maintainability that a contractor has offered. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This report is organized into six chapters.  Chapter II includes background 
and literature reviews for Ao metrics, performance-based logistics (PBL), and 
LCC.  Chapter III discusses the Arena simulation model, the LCC Excel 
spreadsheet model, and the potential for warfighters, logistic teams, program 
managers (PMs), and contracting officers to use them as a decision support tool 
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in making better judgments.  Chapter IV examines the impact of logistic on 
acquisition management.  Chapter V presents the initial case, examines the 
weight impact of the input factors on Ao, readiness risk and LCC, and analyzes 
alternatives for improvement.  Chapter VI offers the authors' overall conclusions 
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II. BACKGROUND  
A. USMC MAINTENANCE PROGRAM  
1. Introduction 
Maintenance in the Marine Corps is broadly defined as those actions 
required to restore materiel to an operating condition or to maintain materiel in a 
serviceable condition.  To accomplish the task of maintaining ground equipment 
such as the LAV-25, the Marine Corps maintenance system is broken down into 
three categories: organizational, intermediate, and depot.  To allow for better 
organization and to adequately identify the capabilities of each unit (e.g., 
personnel, tools, equipment, and parts) within the maintenance system, 
organizational and intermediate levels of maintenance are further subdivided into 
two echelons of maintenance (EOM) with depot level maintenance containing 
one EOM (Department of the Navy, 1989). 
2. Description of Maintenance Categories 
a. Organizational Maintenance 
Organizational maintenance is the preventive (scheduled) or 
unscheduled maintenance that is required and conducted by the unit, which has 
the equipment assigned as part of its Table of Equipment (TOE) (Department of 
the Navy, 1989). 
b. Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate maintenance is the maintenance conducted by 
activities designated to provide direct support to end users (warfighters).  This 
category of maintenance includes such activities as the repair and replacement 
of damaged or unserviceable parts, as well as calibration.  In addition, personnel 
assigned to the intermediate maintenance activity provide technical assistance to 
end users as necessary.  Third and 4th echelons of maintenance are normally 
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conducted at this level, with the 2nd echelon being completed when the workload 
at the organizational level exceeds its capacity (Department of the Navy, 1989). 
c. Depot Maintenance 
Depot maintenance is the maintenance that requires parts, 
subassemblies, assemblies, or entire end items to be overhauled or completely 
rebuilt.  This category also includes the modification of existing parts, 
subassemblies, assemblies, and end items, and the performance testing of these 
modifications.  Depot level maintenance supports lower level maintenance 
categories by conducting maintenance that is beyond its capabilities and 
responsibilities and by providing technical assistance when required.  The 5th 
echelon maintenance is conducted at the depot level (Department of the Navy, 
1989). 
3. Description of Echelons of Maintenance 
a. 1st Echelon 
The 1st echelon conducts either scheduled (preventive) or 
unscheduled maintenance, performed by the equipment owner or operator, 
which a unit has assigned as part of its Table of Equipment (TOE).  This EOM 
includes such tasks as lubrication, preservation, cleaning, and necessary minor 
adjustments to allow the equipment to function properly.  Minor repairs, parts 
replacement, and post-repair adjustments and operational testing are also 
conducted at this level in accordance with pertinent technical publications 
(Department of the Navy, 1989). 
b. 2nd Echelon 
The 2nd echelon is maintenance that is beyond the capabilities of 
the first EOM and requires the organization to have specially trained personnel 
assigned and advanced facilities and equipment to complete.  All additional 
repair parts, test equipment, tools, supplies, and specially trained personnel 
required by activities responsible for conducting this EOM are specifically 
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allocated by orders and publications.  Maintenance performed at this level 
includes scheduled maintenance, easily diagnosed and traced malfunctions, and 
the replacement of major components that can be easily removed and reinstalled 
and do not require significant adjustments or testing (Department of the Navy, 
1989). 
c. 3rd Echelon 
The 3rd echelon maintenance is conducted by specially trained 
personnel and is permissible at the intermediate or organizational levels only as 
authorized by appropriate publications.  This EOM includes the diagnosis of 
malfunctions at the equipment and module level; the use of test, measurement, 
and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) for troubleshooting, adjustment, and 
alignment of modules; repair by replacement of components not requiring 
extensive post-maintenance testing; and modular component cleaning, seal 
replacement and the installation of external parts.  This level of maintenance also 
includes the completion of minor bodywork and emissions testing of internal 
combustion engines (Department of the Navy, 1989). 
d. 4th Echelon 
The 4th echelon maintenance is conducted within intermediate 
maintenance activities.  This EOM is normally performed at semi-fixed or 
permanent repair facilities and includes such tasks as diagnostics, 
troubleshooting, calibration, and the repair of malfunctions of printed circuit 
boards and integrated solid-state devices and circuits down to the component 
level.  In addition, the repair of items such as valves, tappets, and seats by 
means of grinding, adjusting, or replacement is also performed at this EOM.  This 
level of maintenance also includes heavy body, hull turret, and frame repair 
(Department of the Navy, 1989). 
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e. 5th Echelon 
The 5th echelon maintenance is completed at the depot level and 
at intermediate maintenance activities when specially permitted by the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) code.  Maintenance at this echelon 
includes the complete overhaul or rebuilding of parts, subassemblies, 
assemblies, or entire end items.  This category also includes modifications to 
existing parts, subassemblies, assemblies, and end items, and the performance 
testing of these modifications.  Depot level maintenance supports lower level 
maintenance categories by conducting maintenance that is beyond its 
capabilities and responsibilities and by providing technical assistance when 
required (Department of the Navy, 1989). 
B. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY (AO) 
Operational availability (Ao) is the primary performance measure of 
readiness for weapon systems, subsystems, and equipment (Department of the 
Navy, 2003).  Before defining Ao, it is necessary to define readiness and 
reliability. 
According to the Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms 
(2005), readiness is the  
state of preparedness of forces or weapon system or systems to 
meet a mission or to warfight.  Based on adequate and trained 
personnel, material condition, supplies/reserves of support system 
and ammunition, numbers of units available, etc. (p. B-137) 
According to the OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3000.12A Operational 
Availability Handbook (2003) the definition of reliability is  
the ability of a system and its part to perform its intended mission 
for a specified period of time under state conditions without failure, 
degradation or demand on the support system.  (p. 67) 
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The definition of Ao for the U.S. Navy is given in the OPNAV 
INSTRUCTION 3000.12A Operational Availability Handbook (2003) as follows: 
Operational Availability (Ao) is defined as the probability that the 
system will be ready to perform its specified function, in its specified 
and intended operational environment, when called for at a random 
point in time. (p. 10) 
In the same handbook Ao is given as follows: 
Operational Availability is a probability function of reliability, 




Total Time UpTime DownTime
 
 
   
 
Total time has two sub-factors, “up time” and “down time”.  The “up 
time” is the time a system is operational between failures.  The 
“down time” is the time the system is not operational.  Operational 
Availability is the supportability calculation of the equipment/system 
(hardware & software) in terms of predicted Reliability called Mean 
Time between Failures (MTBF) and predicted Maintainability in 
terms of Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) and designed supportability, 
called Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT). (Department of the 
Navy, 2003, p. 4)   







The final analytical form of the equation will be presented at the end of 
Section B when MTBF, MTTR, and MLDT have been discussed. 
As already stated, the terms mean time between failures (MTBF), mean 
time to repair (MTTR), and mean logistics delay times (MLDT) are discussed 
later.  The term mean logistics delay times (MLDT) defines the support activities, 
such as re-order, transportation, repair time, etc.  If this term is omitted then the 
above equation defines the inherent availability (Ai), which measures the inherent 
availability performance of the system (Department of the Navy, 2003).  
Obviously Ai is referring to an ideal support environment where there are no 
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constraints regarding logistics (i.e., infinite spare parts, no re-order or 
transportation delays, etc).  However, Ai can be used in the design phase of a 
system or when it is desired to measure the effects of MTBF and MTTR on the 
availability of a system. 
1. Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
According to the OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3000.12A Operational 
Availability Handbook (2003) the mean time between failures is  
for a particular interval, the total functional life of a population of an 
item divided by the total number of failures within the population.  
The definition holds for time, rounds, miles, events, or other 
measures of life unit.  (Department of the Navy, 2003, p. 63) 
Practically it is the system’s operational time between failures.  MTBF is 




  , where λ is the failure rate. 
Various software programs and simulation models have been developed 
to predict the MTBF of a weapon system.  Usually, the users determine and 
select components/parts that are critical and when those components fail the 
whole system is “down.”  The MTBF of these components/parts are used in order 
to determine the MTBF of the whole system. 
2. Mean Time to Repair (MTTR)  
One of the two “downtime” measures is the mean time to repair (MTTR); 
the other is the mean logistics delay time (MLDT). The MTTR is the measure for 
the maintainability too.  According to the OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3000.12A 
Operational Availability Handbook (2003), the mean time to repair is 
the average time for a successful repair and includes the average 




component, return the equipment to its original condition, and 
replace and retest any system (interference) removed to get to the 
failed equipment. (p. 6) 
It depends on the level of the components’ spares in the spare pool (in 
case of replacing the failure components) or the three levels1 of maintenance 
capacity (in case of repairing it).  On the other hand, the spares availability and 
the maintenance capacity depend on the available budgets, which are 
categorized as the operational and maintenance (O&M) budgets.  Several 
models for spares are currently being used and are known as Readiness Based 
Sparing2 (RBS) models in the U.S. Navy.  Correspondingly, the Aviation Retail 
Requirements Oriented to Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (ARROWS) model 
is used by aviation. 
3. Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT) 
The mean logistics delay time (MLDT) is a measure for the support 
activities, such as re-ordering, transportation, repair time, etc (Department of the 
Navy, 2003).  The MLDT depends on the mean supply response time (MSRT), 
mean outside assistance delay time (MOADT), and mean administrative delay 
Time (MadmDT).  The MSRT is "the average portion of down time awaiting 
receipt of the spare component" (Department of the Navy, 2003, p. 63).  It is the 
single greatest driver in MLDT (Department of the Navy, 2003).  The MOADT is 
the "average time awaiting maintenance teams from other locations or depot" 
(Department of the Navy, 2003, p.63)  The MadmDT is the average time awaiting 
logistics resources (administrative resources) other than spare parts (e.g., 
awaiting qualified maintenance personnel, support equipment, technical data, 
training, facilities etc) (Department of the Navy, 2003, p. 4). 
                                            
1 The three level of maintenance are organizational (O), intermediate (I), and depot (D) 
(Department of the Navy, 2003). 
2 Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) is the practice of using advanced analytics to set spare 
levels and locations to maximize system readiness. RBS has been part of department practice 
since the 1960s when it was used to optimize aircraft availability, and is incorporated into the DoD 
Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation (DoD 4140.1-R) as the preferred method for 
calculating inventory levels. The services and DLA have agreed to work together to implement 
commercial off the shelf (COTS)-based RBS models (Supply Chain Integration, 2009). 
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Hence, the Ao is determined by the system’s component level reliability 
(the reciprocal of failure rates-MTBF), maintainability (repair time-MTTR) of the 
failure components or the entire system, and the supportability (logistic delay 




MTBF MDT Mean DownTime MTBF MTTR MLDT
 






MTBF MTTR MSRT MOADT MadmDT

   
 
This will be the mathematical definition that will be used for the purpose of 
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Figure 1.   Operational Availability (Ao) Components 
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4. Operation Availability in Acquisition and Readiness Risk 
Operational availability is a crucial performance measure as it depicts the 
weapon systems that can participate in operations.  Also, the readiness and its 
measure Ao have been integrated in the acquisition process.  The Ao is a key 
performance parameter (KPP)3 for deciding the acquisition of a weapon system 
and it affects the total life cycle cost.  In the early phase of an acquisition an initial 
Ao threshold is created to support the mission requirements.  This initial Ao 
threshold is used in “performance-based contracts” to reduce the buyers’ risk and 
total life cycle cost.  The operational availability metric helps the program 
manager to upgrade a system’s capabilities, and at the same time sustain and/or 
increase readiness and cost performance (Department of the Navy, 2003).  
In the last decade there has been a preference for buying performance 
instead of a product or service using performance-based logistics4 (PBL) 
contracts and performance-based agreements5 (PBA).  Ao is identified as the 
one of two valued performance outcomes; the other one is readiness risk (Kang, 
Doerr, & Sanchez, 2006).  PBL are the DoD’s preferred–-required for new–- 
sustainment strategy (Department of Defense, 2008).  The “readiness risk” is a 
metric that measures the probability that a contractor (e.g., vendor, depot, 
maintenance unit) will fail to deliver a desired threshold of Ao in a contract, and it 
                                            
3 Key performance parameters (KPPs): Those attributes or characteristics of a system that 
are considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability and those 
attributes that make a significant contribution to the key characteristics as defined in the Joint 
Operations Concept. KPPs are validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for 
JROC Interest documents, and by the DoD Component for Joint Integration or Independent 
documents. The Capability Development Document (CDD) and the Capability Production 
Document (CPD) KPPs are included verbatim in the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
(Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 2005). 
4 Performance-based logistics (PBL): The preferred sustainment strategy for weapon system 
product support that employs the purchase of support as an integrated, affordable performance 
package designed to optimize system readiness. PBL meets performance goals for a weapon 
system through a support structure based on long-term performance agreements with clear lines 
of authority and responsibility (Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 2005). 
5 Performance-based agreements (PBAs): establish a negotiated baseline of performance, 
and corresponding support necessary to achieve that performance, whether provided by 
commercial or organic support providers. PBAs with users specify the level of operational support 
and performance required by users (AT&L Integrated Framework Chart). 
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is associated with the contract performance.  For this, it is essential to develop 
simulation models for testing and evaluating Ao and the impact it has on total life 
cycle management.  Many works identify this need, among them Gary A. Pryor 
from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine command, who includes it in the 
conclusion of his article regarding the methodology for estimating Ao for military 
systems (Pryor, 2008). 
C. LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC) 
Life cycle cost (LCC) is the total government or ownership cost of all 
categories of cost during the whole weapon system’s life (Department of the 
Navy, 2003).  The total LCC includes the research and development (R&D) cost, 
investment cost (production cost), operating and support (O&S) cost, and 
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The Department of Defense refers to total LCC as the total ownership cost 
(TOC).  The TOC is  
designed to determine the true cost of design, development, 
ownership and support of DoD weapons systems.  At the DoD 
level, Total Ownership Cost is comprised of the costs to research, 
develop, acquire, own, operate and dispose of weapon systems, 
other equipment and real property, the costs to recruit, retain, 
separate, and otherwise support military and civilian personnel, and 
all other costs of the business operations of the DoD.  At the 
individual program level, Total Ownership Cost is synonymous with 
the life cycle cost of the system. (Department of the Navy, 2003, p. 
69) 
For the purposes of this project the authors consider that total LCC is 
identical to TOC.  The assumption of this project, discussed in Chapter III, is that 
the total LCC is the O&S cost. 
The O&S cost consists of the biggest portion of the LCC (60-80%), and 
depends on a system’s reliability, maintainability, and supportability (Naegle, 
2008).  The limited funds and resources (number of systems, infrastructures, and 
personnel) are a major constraint for the Ao and they set a ceiling for the pre-
planning of LCC.  As the Ao is a critical factor for operational effectiveness, many 
models are trying to find the optimum combination of maintainability and 
supportability in order to improve Ao and minimize LCC.  Those models are 
taking into account the budget constraints. 
The intention of the Department of Defense and the commercial defense 
industry is to improve weapons system Ao at a reduced cost and especially the 
O&S cost.  This means reliability, maintainability, and supportability improvement 
at a reduced cost.  The possible alternative actions for Ao improvement with 
reduced cost are as follows: 
1. Reduction of the occurrence of system failure (better reliability). 
2. Faster equipment maintenance (improve maintainability).  
3. Less logistic delays (better supportability). 
4. A combination of all or some of the above.  
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There are LCC models that calculate the cost of each alternative, and they 
are utilized as decision tools for the buyers (government or owners), warfighters, 
system makers, and contractors (vendors).  Furthermore, the LCC is used in the 
acquisition process; the initial estimation of the program’s cost serves as a guide 
during the life cycle of the system.  There are models that continuously collect 
and monitor operations and logistics data about reliability, maintainability, and 
supportability (e.g., the number of systems, the past Ao, the failure rate, the 
times for individual work, deliveries, services, the individual subsystem’s cost, the 
number of depots or service-maintenance units, spares, personnel, salaries, etc).  
The models estimate the system's real cost calculation and the deviation 
between the pre-scheduled and the real cost.  
During the system’s program initiation, one has to predict the future 
reliability, maintainability, and supportability prices to estimate the TOC.  The 
prediction involves the risk for an accurate prediction (which is the probability the 
calculated values and initial LCC will fail to predict the future real values).  
Utilizing a simple model such as an Excel spreadsheet, one can change 
parameters or combine them, and thus be able to conduct sensitivity analyses 
and see how all the previous factors influence the total LCC.  Even though the 
Excel spreadsheet model is a useful model, it still remains a static model without 
taking into account the dynamic interference between the Ao’s synthetic 
parameters.  This dynamic can be investigated by developing a simulation model 
with a software tool such as Arena.  Using a combination of these models (Excel 
spreadsheet and Arena software), one can choose the best cost effectiveness 




In order to answer the question of which of the factors (components’ rate 
failure (λ), number of spares in spare inventory, maintenance turnaround time 
(TAT), Op-Tempo) has the greater impact on the operational availability (Ao), 
and the life cycle cost (LCC), 257 different scenarios were drafted for each case.  
For each case, predetermined factor ranges or mean values will be used in 
accordance with the initial data and project’s assumptions.  Then, for each case 
they will be generated random values (stochastic element that occurs during the 
generation of the pseudo-random numbers) in accordance with the factor ranges 
and mean values.  For generating the λ values the authors will take the following 
steps:  
 Generate random values using a Poisson distribution with means in 
accordance with the fourth column of Table 6 (mean operating time 
between failures). 
 Calculate the reciprocals of the Poisson random variates generated 
in the previous step; the result will be the λ values (which are not 
integers) that will be used for this project.   
For the rest of the factors the authors will use a normal distribution; the 
mean μ and the standard deviation σ are described in the input data table for 
each case. 
With the 257 scenarios for each case, the variable factors’ values are 
trying to simulate the dynamic situation of a major weapon system during its life 
operation in peace time or under contingency operations.  To measure changes 
in Ao and LCC, a simulation model, which is a combination of Arena and Excel 
spreadsheet software simulations, will be used for comparing several options.  
The Arena software simulation program can be used to support results that 
incorporate the interactions between the factors, when one or more parameters 
change in each scenario.  By using the components’ MTBF, number of available 
spares in the inventory, maintenance TAT (in this project the maintenance TAT 
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includes the MTTR and the MLDT) and Op-Tempo as input parameters for each 
scenario in the Arena model, the authors can extract as output the average Ao 
for the system’s life cycle.  Then, using the Excel spreadsheet, they can calculate 
the LCC for each scenario.  
Using the Ao values’ distribution, the authors can extract the quantiles of 
Ao6, and the readiness risk (the probability that an Ao value falls below a desired 
Ao threshold).  That data and the cumulative Ao can be transferred in an Excel 
spreadsheet and be visualized in a chart for decision making.  Returning back to 
the Excel spreadsheet, one can calculate the Ao, readiness risk, and LCC for 
each of the alternative cases. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
Due to the plethora of LAV-25 components, over 1,500, research on all 
cross-possible scenarios in conjunction with the input factors will be impractical 
and timeless.  A good solution for the authors is to limit their research and 
modeling to a limited number of parts (using the Pareto principle, also known as 
the “80-20 rule”)7, especially those that are the most costly to buy or repair and 
are considered critical (if a failure occurs, the LAV is non-operational).  The 
authors' research and simulation modeling will concentrate on five major critical 
repairable parts (Table 1).  These five parts represent 65 percent8 of the total 
cost of replacement parts currently maintained by the USMC for the LAV-25, and 
are considered critical (Table 1, criticality code “5”). 
                                            
6 Quantiles are points taken at regular intervals from the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of a random variable. In the authors' case the Ao quantiles will be 5%, 10%, 15%, ... 
,100% of Ao (Keller, 2009). 
7 The Pareto principle, also known as the “80-20 rule” and the law of the vital few and the 
principle of factor sparsity, states that, for many events, roughly 80% of the effects come from 
20% of the causes. 
8 MCDSS: Marine Corps Decision Support System. Automated decision support system 
(logistics information systems) designed to support Logistic Command (LogCom) logistics 
managers, from the IM to the commander in strategic logistics decision-making processes. It 
provides data extracts from maintenance, inventory, and finance systems to perform decision 




















to total cost 
1 
Sensor Unit, Laser  $89,794 0.000211638 2 5 PAFHD $10,775,318 37% 
2 Control Display 
Unit 
$27,683 0.000363312 1 5 PAOFD $13,848,172 47% 
3 Differential, 
Driving 
$22,475 0.0000890643 4 5 PAOHH $16,118,151 55% 
4 
Engine, Diesel $41,757 0.000109346 1 5 PAFHD $17,663,146 60% 
5 
Engine, Diesel $26,890 0.000126983 1 5 PAFHD $18,738,755 64% 
Table 1.   LAV-25 Part Usage (After: MCDSS 4.3.1.1, PartUsage_EO947, 
2007-2009) 8   
For the purpose of this project, the echelon turnaround times (TATs) are 
considered the sum of the repair time (MTTR), administration time, and 
transportation delay time.  This project does not consider “cannibalization,” the 
swapping of a working component from one downed LAV-25 to another. 
The Excel spreadsheet model computes the operational and support 
(O&S) cost, a portion of the total life cycle cost, including spare, repair, 
transportation, and operation costs.  For the purpose of this project the authors 
will consider the life cycle cost of the O&S cost. 
Readiness risk is defined as the probability that Ao falls below a certain 
threshold level.  For this report the authors set the threshold of Ao as 75% and 
the probability of not achieving this threshold (readiness risk) is Prob [Ao < 0.75] 
< 0.10 (i.e., readiness risk less than 10%).  The target mean Ao is set to 85%. 
                                            
9 According to the data from Table 1, the failure rates were given as the number of failures 
per million days, which is too low.  Even using one calendar day as a time unit, the failure rates 
still remain too low, or the components are unusually too reliable .  Instead of the failures per 
million days in the authors' project they will use the provided data as failures per calendar hour.  




A combination of Arena and Excel spreadsheet software simulations were 
used in this project.  These two models have been presented and developed by 
Kang et al. (2009).  Even though the Excel spreadsheet model by itself is a 
simple and useful model for the decision makers (e.g., program manager, 
logistics designers, or financial administrators), it is a “static” model that does not 
take into account the dynamic interference (vicious cycle) between the Ao’s 
synthetic parameters.  For example, a decrease in MTBF decreases Ao and 
increases LCC, because low Ao increases the frequency of repairs and induces 
higher maintenance costs.  Ao is further reduced when these increased 
maintenance costs eventually lead to budget reductions and force a reduction in 
the frequency of preventive maintenance.  This “vicious cycle” (Figure 1) 
continuously lowers Ao, ultimately leading to high-cost corrective (unscheduled) 
maintenance, which further reduces Ao. 
Arena can support results that incorporate the abovementioned vicious 
cycle (interactions) between factors, when one or more parameters are changed 
in each scenario.  Using Arena input parameters such as MTBF, MTBM, MDLT, 
(in this project MTBM and MDLT are incorporated in the maintenance TAT) and 
the number of available spares, the authors can take as output the average Ao 























Figure 3.   Vicious Cycle 
1. Arena Simulation Model  
The model was initially used for the Light Armored Vehicles 25 with a 25 
mm Gun System (LAV-25) case study from Kang et al. (2009).  When a critical 
component of the weapon system fails, the faulty component is removed from the 
system and a ready-for-issue (RFI) spare is installed.  The faulty component is 
sent to the repair echelon.  After the repair is complete, the component becomes 
an RFI spare and is sent to the spare inventory pool.  If an RFI spare is not 
available at the repair echelon, the system will be grounded (and will become not 
mission capable) until an RFI spare is available (Figure 4).  The failure of a 
noncritical component may degrade readiness, but the system is assumed to be 


























Figure 4.   The Repair Cycle 
A brief description of the Arena simulation model (it is used as a case 
study for the LAV-25) logic is as follows: 
 
1. Input data are read from an Excel input spreadsheet that includes 
the input data for the corresponding scenario for each case.  For 
each case the authors use 257 different scenarios. 
2. For the model, 76 LAV-25s (as entities) are generated, which have 
been deployed as Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). 
3. In accordance with the input data, the model generates for each 
scenario five parts’ failures times.  The model looks for the smallest 
value between the five failures and whichever is the smallest value is 
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4. The “down” (non-operative) LAV-25 is transferred to the repair 
echelon and the faulty part is removed from the LAV-25.  The 
number of fully mission capable (FMC) LAVs is reduced by one: 
1FMC FMC  . 
5. The faulty part is sent to the repair echelon. 
6. At the repair echelon the “down” LAV-25 becomes “up” (operative) if 
a spare part is available and accordance with the repair time.  If a 
spare is installed and the LAV-25 returns back to the MEF, the 
number of FMC is now increased by one: FMC = FMC +1.  
Otherwise, the LAV-25 waits in the queue until a spare from the 
spare inventory is available. 
7. After the delay into repair echelons as specified in the Excel input 
spreadsheet, the repaired part joins the spare inventory. 
8. Steps 1-7 are repeated until the end of the simulation time. 
9. At the end each of scenario, the simulation automatically calculates 
the average operational availability (Ao) as follows:  
average FMC LAV
Ao
total number of LAV
 

    
Ao is a time-persistent variable and the average value of Ao must be 
“time-averaged” (Kelton, Sadowski, & Sturrock, 2007).  The Arena model 
automatically computes the value.  A sample screen shot of the LAV-25 Arena 
simulation model is given in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.   LAV-25 Arena Simulation Model (After: Kang et al., 2009) 
 26 
For each scenario, the simulation model will use the following inputs 
(Figure 6, Columns A through M): the failure rates/hour for each of the five 
components (λi, i=1, 2…5): the number of spares stocked; the repair turnaround 
time (TAT) for each component (TAT includes the maintenance time, 
transportation, administration and logistic delays); and Op-Tempo (the annual 
work time in hours for the weapon system).  For the failure rates, repair 
turnaround time for each component, and Op-Tempo, the input values will be 
random numbers (stochastic prices) generated based on an average value in 
accordance with the real data and the pre-defined value ranges from the authors’ 
assumptions, or the alternatives.  In the Arena simulation model, the authors will 
run a total of 257 scenarios, each for a period of 20 years (175,000 hours), using 
as input the chain of the random values from each row.  Each row from the input 
Excel spreadsheet includes the input data for the corresponding scenario.  This 
model’s output will be the average Ao for each scenario and will be written to the 
previous Excel spreadsheet in a new column (average Ao output value, Figure 6, 
Column N).  Moreover, the average Ao outputs for each scenario will give the 
authors a distribution of Ao values.  Using statistics and Excel software, the 
authors can extract the descriptive statistics data for the Ao’s distribution, and 
then determine the readiness risk. 
 
Figure 6.   A Screen Shot of Excel Input-Output Spreadsheet 
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2. Excel Spreadsheet Model 
The Excel spreadsheet model is an Excel spreadsheet that computes the 
operational and support (O&S) cost.  The original model was first used for the 
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) case study10 by Prof. Keebom Kang and is 
described in the Logistics Engineering (GB 4410) class lecture notes at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, CA (Kang, 2010).  The Excel spreadsheet model uses as 
inputs the number of weapon systems, life cycle period, hourly operating cost, 
hourly repair cost, transportation cost per failure, annual discount rate, the annual 
spare parts usage rate, and the unit cost of each component.  These inputs are 
used only in the Excel spreadsheet model (depicted in yellow in Figure 7).  
Additionally, it uses as inputs the component’s failure rate, the average TAT, the 
number of spares in the inventory pool, and the Op-Tempo.  These inputs are 
used also in the Arena model (depicted in green in Figure 7). 
A visual basic macro program was provided by Kang et al. (2009) to 
calculate the LCC for each of the 257 scenarios.  Once the macro is executed, it 
reads the input parameters for each scenario.  The calculated LCC for the 
current scenario is extracted in the Excel spreadsheet (cell A35 in Figure 7).  
Before executing the next scenario, the calculated LCC is copied in the 
respective Arena Excel spreadsheet (column O in Figure 6). 
Using the output data from the LCC column, the descriptive statistics data 
for the LCC (e.g., the average LCC and its standard deviation for each case) can 
be extracted, and the relationships between LCC, Ao, readiness risk and the 
other input factors’ values can be identified. 
D.  DATA GATHERING  
The collecting data for LAV-25 components’ average failure rate (λ), unit 
cost, identification of critical and non-critical components, and source 
maintenance and recoverability (SMR) code, which determines the echelon of 
                                            
10 UAV case study by Prof. Keebom Kang,  (Kang, 2010). 
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maintenance, were adopted from MCDSS11 4.3.11, Part Usage EO974 (2007-
2009).  The rest of the data was collected from telephone calls, electronic mails 
(e-mail), and note taking. 
In the case of the absence of actual data and in order to apply the models 
to current LAV-25 systems, the authors used estimated data or value ranges, 
especially for the number of spares in inventory, the echelon turnaround time 
(TAT), and Op-Tempo.  Additionally, estimated data were used for the hourly 
operating cost, hourly repair cost, transportation cost per failure, annual discount 
rate, and the annual spare parts usage rate, These estimations remained the 
same in all cases so that a common base of cost comparison between the cases 
could be established. 
 
 
                                            
11MCDSS: Marine Corps Decision Support System.  Automated decision support system 
(logistics information systems) designed to support Logistic Command (LogCom) logistics 
managers, from the IM to the commander in strategic logistics decision-making processes. It 
provides data extracts from maintenance, inventory, and finance systems to perform decision 




Figure 7.   A Screen Shot of the LCC Excel Spreadsheet Model (After: Kang et al., 2009) 
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E. LIMITATIONS 
The accuracy of the Arena simulation and LCC Excel spreadsheet model 
calculations are only as good as the input data provided.  If actual data can be 
retrieved for every input factor, the Ao, readiness risk and LCC will be a true 
calculation.  When the data provided are estimated or assumed, the models then 
only provide the best possible results.  For the Arena model the inputs become a 
limitation as only this data is used strictly by the model to calculate Ao and 
readiness risk.  The current set up of the model allows only the components 
failure rate (λi) input of the five components of the LAV-25  If the model was 
developed to include all the components’ λi, then a more accurate assessment of 
the actual Ao and readiness risk could be determined.  
F. APPLICATION 
These models can be used on any weapon system if the data can be 
retrieved.  By making minor changes to the model (system components, etc.), the 
model may be applied to many weapon systems currently in use throughout the 
Department of Defense (DoD), such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) Vehicle, and aircraft such as the F-22 or F-35.  
This model allows the warfighters and logistics teams to decide which of 
the Ao’s synthetic parameters are more sensitive to maintain specific levels of Ao 
and readiness risk in conjunction with the cost and the logistics or operational 
constraints (i.e., number of spares in the inventory, maintenance TAT, Op-
Tempo).  Warfighters and logistics teams can suggest alternative maintenance 
policies that will have impact on desired maintainability, supportability, and finally 
on Ao and readiness risk.  
Lastly, it equips the PMs and contracting officers with the ability to make better 
sound judgments if a proposal by a contractor is being offered, and ensures that 
a cost-effective and reliable weapon system will be available for the warfighters.  
In the early phase of an acquisition, an initial Ao threshold as a key performance 
parameter (KPP) is created to support mission requirements. 
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IV. LOGISTIC IMPACT INTO ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
A. INTEGRATED DEFENSE ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
LOGISTICS LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Logistics is a crucial component in the contemporary acquisition process.  
Logistics are involved in all phases of the acquisition framework, from the 
definition of the requirement to the disposal of the system.  In major weapon 
systems, the main impact of logistics is during the operation and support phase, 
otherwise known as the sustainment phase.  However, it is of great importance 
for the life cycle management and total ownership cost how effectively and 
efficiently the issues of mission supportability and overall support capability are 
addressed during the design and development phases. 
The life cycle logistics for the acquisition of weapon systems is defined by 
the Defense Acquisition University as  
the planning, development, implementation, and management of a 
comprehensive, affordable, and effective systems support strategy 
within Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM).  Life cycle 
logistics encompasses the entire system’s life cycle including 
acquisition (design, develop, test, produce, and deploy), 
sustainment (operations and support), and disposal.  The principal 
goals/objectives of acquisition logisticians are to: 
1. Influence product design for affordable system operational 
effectiveness. 
2. Design and develop the support system utilizing performance 
based logistics. 
3. Acquire and concurrently deploy the supportable system, 
including support infrastructure.  
4. Maintain/improve readiness, improve affordability, and minimize 
logistics footprint. (Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics Life Cycle Management System Chart, 2009) 
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The life cycle logistics overview in relation with the integrated defense 
acquisition, technology, and logistics life cycle management system is presented 
in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Life Cycle Logistics Overview (From: Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
2010) 
The DoD Directive 5000.01 (2003) mandates that “acquisition programs 
shall be managed through the application of a systems engineering approach 
that optimizes total system performance and minimizes total ownership costs.”  
Furthermore, supportability and life cycle costs are important parameters for the 
acquisition.  Program managers have to follow a total systems approach and are 
held accountable for the life cycle systems management, including sustainment 
of objectives.   
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Planning for Operation and Support and the estimation of total 
ownership costs shall begin as early as possible.  Supportability, a 
key component of performance, shall be considered throughout the 
system life cycle. (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 10)  
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2010), 
consideration should be given to the effects that the various 
acquisition decisions will have on life cycle management.  A key 
concept of life cycle management is “supportability and 
maintainability as key elements of performance” (Department of 
Defense, 2003, p. 148).  It includes: 
 “Performance-based strategies, including logistics 
 Increased reliability, improved maintainability, and reduced logistics 
footprint 
 Continuing reviews of sustainment strategies”  (Department of 
Defense, 2003, p.148) 
Supportive to the policy established by DoD Directive 5000.01 is the 
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Services from the Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L), signed on July 31, 2008.  The memorandum with subject 
“Implementing a Life Cycle Management Framework” underlines that this 
implementation is a top DoD priority.  It also sets up a strategy and provides 
directions for the following: 
 “Reinforce the implementation of mandatory life cycle sustainment 
metrics 
 Align resources to achieve readiness level 
 Track performance throughout the life cycle 
 Implement performance-based life cycle product support strategies” 
(Department of Defense, 2003 p. 1). 
The memorandum mandates the establishment of target goals for the 
mandatory metrics for life cycle sustainment.  Those metrics, as set by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01F (2007), are availability 
as the sustainment key performance parameter and reliability and ownership cost 
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as key system attributes (KSAs)12.  Most importantly the memorandum mandates 
the use of modeling and simulation tools for analyzing and assessing readiness, 
as well as key life sustainment metrics. 
The most recent document enforcing life cycle management and focusing 
on the improvement of logistics is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as of 
February 12, 2010.  More specifically, the QDR addresses the issue of how to 
improve the execution of acquisition programs and, among others, designates to 
“achieve effective life cycle cost management by employing readiness-based 
sustainment strategies, facilitated by stable and robust government-industry 
partnerships” (Secretary of Defense, 2010, p. 79). 
Earlier QDRs introduced the concern about the impact of logistics in the 
life cycle of a weapon system.  The QDR of 2001 put forth the initiative for the 
DoD to “implement Performance-Based Logistics to compress the supply chain 
and improve readiness for major weapons systems and commodities” (p. 56).  As 
a result, the DoD tried to reduce the logistic footprint and the related costs 
(Secretary of Defense, 2006).  The QDR of 2006 focused on “improving visibility 
into supply chain logistics costs and performance and on building a foundation 
for continuous improvements in performance” (p. 72)  In addition, it recognized 
and directed that various promising initiatives and insights should be “coupled 
with the implementation of continuous process improvement tools like Lean, Six 
Sigma and performance based logistics” for optimizing “the productive output of 
the overall Department of Defense supply chain” (Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 
72). 
 
                                            
12 Key system attribute (KSA):  An attribute or characteristic considered crucial in the support 
of achieving a balanced solution/approach to a key performance parameter (KPP) or some other 
key performance attribute deemed necessary by the sponsor.  KSAs provide decision makers 
with an additional level of capability performance characteristics below the KPP level and require 
a sponsor 4-star , Defense Agency commander, or Principal Staff Assistant to change (Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). 
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All aforementioned policies and directions recognize the need for a life 
cycle management approach and the implementation of life cycle logistics from 
the early stages of the acquisition process.  The main tool that policies and 
directions designate is performance-based logistics, which will be discussed in 
the following section. 
B. PERFORMANCE-BASED LOGISTICS 
Performance-based logistics (PBL), as defined in the Glossary of Defense 
Acquisition Acronyms & Terms (2005) is  
the preferred sustainment strategy for weapon system product 
support that employs the purchase of support as an integrated, 
affordable performance package designed to optimize system 
readiness.  PBL meets performance goals for a weapon system 
through a support structure based on long-term performance 
agreements with clear lines of authority and responsibility. (p. B-
102) 
In plain language, the DoD is buying performance and readiness, instead 
of buying for a specific good or service.  The main goals of PBL are to reduce the 
supply chain, reduce the TOC, and improve the readiness of weapon systems.  
The greatest impact of logistics in TOC is during the operational and support 
phase (or sustainment phase), where most of the costs are incurred. 
The QDR of 2001 advocated the implementation of PBL with the 
appropriate metrics.  As a result, in DoD Directive 5000.01 (2007), which 
“provides management principles and mandatory policies and procedures for 
managing all acquisition programs,” PBL was mandated as policy.  Accordingly,  
PMs shall develop and implement performance-based logistics 
strategies that optimize total system availability while minimizing 
cost and logistics footprint.  Trade-off decisions involving cost, 
useful service, and effectiveness shall consider corrosion 
prevention and mitigation.  Sustainment strategies shall include the 
best use of public and private sector capabilities through 
government/industry partnering initiatives, in accordance with 
statutory requirements. (p. 7) 
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Figure 9.   Total Ownership Cost (From: Hardy, 2007) 
An aggressive effort to implement PBL was mandated by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz (2004).  PBL has been designated as a 
“best business practice,” thus all services were directed to implement PBL on any 
“current and planned weapon system platforms” (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
2004, p. 1).  Availability and readiness should be the purchased by DoD 
products, as measured by the appropriate performance criteria (Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, 2004). 
In the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Memorandum of November 
2005, TLCSM metrics were established.  Those six metrics are used to measure 
the performance of PBL and are the following: 
 Operational availability 
 Mission reliability 
 Total life cycle system cost per unit of usage 
 Cost per unit of usage 
 Logistics footprint 
 Logistics response time 
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The definitions and formulas of metrics given in the memorandum do not 
vary from the definitions and formulas for the above that are used for this project, 
as given in Chapter II.  Also, they do not differentiate from the metrics described 
in the Performance Based Logistics: a Program Manager’s Product Support 
Guide (2005).  The same memorandum (USD (AT&L), 2005) directs the TLCSM 
executive council to develop a “TLCSM metrics handbook,” a task that has not 
been accomplished up to date. 
The Performance Based Logistics: a Product Manager's Product Support 
Guide (2005) sponsors the use of long-term, fixed price with incentives, 
contracts.  The metrics should be linked to the contract incentives that each 
military department establishes.  Furthermore, the metrics, their definition, and 
the period of performance should be clearly defined in PBL contracts.  The 
incentives are important in PBL contracts as the risk is more on the side of the 
contractor providing the agreed performance and support.  Nonetheless, it is the 
agency’s responsibility to appropriately weigh the metrics and identify the 
strategy that will have the desired outcomes. 
In the same guide it is also designated that  
The PBL application will meet the warfighter’s operational 
requirements and be cost-effective as validated by a Business 
Case Analysis13 (BCA).  PBL utilizes a performance based 
acquisition strategy that is developed, refined, and implemented 
during the systems acquisition process for new programs or as a 
result of an assessment of performance and support alternatives for 
fielded systems.  PBL can help PMs optimize performance and cost 
objectives through the strategic implementation of varying degrees  
of government-industry partnerships. (Performance Based 
Logistics: A Product Manager's Product Support Guide, 2005. p. 2-
3) 
                                            
13 Business case Analysis (BCA): A PBL BCA is an expanded cost/benefit analysis created 
with the intent of determining a best-value solution for product support.  Alternatives weigh total 
costs against total benefits to arrive at the optimum solution.  The PBL BCA process goes beyond 
cost/benefit or traditional economic analyses by linking each alternative to how it fulfills strategic 
objectives of the program; how it complies with product support performance measures; and the 
resulting impact on stakeholders.  A PBL BCA is a tailored process driven by the dynamics of the 
pending investment decision to adopt a PBL strategy (Performance Based Logistics: A Product 
Manager's Product Support Guide, 2005). 
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PBL has been used in many major weapon system acquisitions since its 
introduction in the early 1990s (General Accountability Office, 2004).  PBL has 
been used in both platform and subsystem or component levels.  Table 2 lists 
some of the major weapon systems that implemented PBL (Product Support for 
the 21st Century: a Program Manager's Guide to Buying Performance, 2001), 
(Performance Based Logistics: A Product Manager's Product Support Guide, 
2005), (Government Accountability Office, 2008).  The first document providing 
detailed guidance for the implementation of PBL was the Product Support for the 
21st Century: a Program Manager’s Guide to Buying Performance (2001), 
commonly known as “The PBL Guide.”  This document not only provided PBL 
guidance but introduced DoD’s Reduction in TOC (R-TOC) program for selected 
weapon systems.  This document was superseded in 2005 by the Performance 
Based Logistics: a Product Manager's Product Support Guide. 
There is a lot of discussion regarding the effectiveness of the 
implementation in relation to the objectives.  The GAO report of 2004 reviewed 
“DoD’s process of implementing PBL as the preferred support strategy for its 
weapon system” (Government Accountability Office, 2004).  The findings were 
that the DoD’s recommendation was for PBL application at the weapon platform 
level, as the one used for T-45 Navy training aircraft, rather than the component 
level.  However, the GAO found that most of the 185 PBL programs that were 
identified for the purposes of the report were at a subsystem or component level.  
Moreover, the GAO found that the private sector industry with same life cycle 
management and TOC concerns differ in their approach regarding PBL.  They 
use it as a tool rather than as a concept approach, and almost exclusively at a 
subsystem or component level.  On the other hand, the companies examined in 
the report were relying more on time and material contracts.  Time and material 
contracts is a high-risk approach that the DoD prefers to avoid (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, 2005).  
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Army Consolidated automated support system Air Force 
Tube-launched optically-tracked wire-guided 
missile – Improved target acquisition system 
T-45 engine F-16 engines 
Javelin antitank missile KC-130J T-6A Joint primary air training system 
High mobility artillery rocket system V-22 engine F-117A Nighthawk 
RQ-7B Shadow tactical unmanned aircraft 
system 
Phalanx close-In weapon system F-22 Raptor 
Sentinel radar F-404 Engine B-2 Spirit 
Patriot air defense system Auxiliary power units (APU) Secondary power systems 
AH-64D Apache helicopter - Sensors AEGIS Cruiser 
E8-C Joint surveillance target attack radar 
system 
AH-D64D Apache helicopter – Airframe CVN-68 
LITENING Advanced airborne targeting and 
navigation pod 
AN/TSQ-179AV(2) Common ground station LPD-17 Sniper advanced targeting pod 
Abrams M-1 Tank H-60 series helicopters C-130J Hercules  
Chinook CH-47 
Standoff land attack missile – Expanded 
response 
C-17 Globemaster 
Guardrail / Common sensor Advanced amphibious assault vehicle C-5 Galaxy 
Navy Aircraft tires E-3A AWACS 
Crusader Marine Corps C/KC 135 Stratotanker 
ALR-67 (V3) Expeditionary fighting vehicle  
AV-8B Harrier Assault breacher vehicle  
Table 2.   PBL Supported Weapon System Programs [After: (Product Support for the 21st Century: a Program 
Manager’s Guide to Buying Performance, 2001),  (Performance Based Logistics: A Product Manager's 
Product Support Guide, 2005),  (Government Accountability Office, 2008)] 
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In conclusion, the GAO recommended using PBL as “a tool to achieve 
economies at the subsystem or component level” (Government Accountability 
Office, 2004, p. 20).  The DoD concurred with the recommendation. 
The Performance Based Logistics: a Program Manager's Product Support 
Guide (2005), incorporates examples of PBL programs that characterizes them 
as successful.  Among them are the weapon systems chosen as pilots for the R-
TOC program.  According to the guide the PBL implementation for the R-TOC 
program “has been highly successful, reaping significant cost savings / 
avoidance and identifying leassons learned” (p. 5-7). The projected savings from 
1997 to 2005 was expected to exceed $1.3 billion (Pallas, 2002), as presented in 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.   R-TOC Pilot Programs Savings/Benefits (From: Pallas, 2002) 
In a report published later in 2005, the GAO found that the DoD did not 
demonstrate any benefits from the PBL programs that the GAO reviewed.  That 
was because the respective program offices did not update the business case 
analysis (BCA) as the Performance Based Logistics: a Product Manager's 
Product Support Guide (2005) directs. In the only case, out of the fifteen 
reviewed, that BCA was updated the results showed that the PBL contract “did 
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not result in the expected cost savings and the weapon system did not meet 
established performance requirements” (Governement Accountability Office, 
2005, p. 3) The main reason for not updating BCAs was that program offices 
assumed that in any case the fixed-price PBL contracts would be less costly than 
the traditionnal contracts. However, the findings of the review on the single 
program that did the BCA, namely the T-45 Navy training aircraft, are particularly 
interesting for the purposes of this MBA report. The T-45 program office updated 
the BCA on the fact that the contractor could not meet the aircraft availability 
performance metric. This incurred more cost per flying hours than it was 
estimated. The program office then re-negotiated new contracts in a subsystem 
level for airframes and engines. The estimated cost savings of these new 
contracts were $144 million over five years. For the history, the GAO suggested 
that the USD (AT&L) should reaffirm guidance for the BCA update, and better 
direct PBL contractor performance as well as the involvement of the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA).  The DoD concurred with the GAO’s recommendations. 
The latest GAO report regarding PBL was published in December 2008.  
The findings were that the GAO’s perspective on the ability of PBL to reduce 
TOC was unclear.  According to the report, BCAs “have not been used 
consistently or effectively to influence decision making regarding PBL” 
(Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 14).  The main reason was that 
BCAs were not appropriately updated or the provided data were not adequate to 
come to a safe conclusion regarding the benefits of PBL and the accomplishment 
of objectives.  Furthermore, the GAO identified that the DoD has put more 
emphasis on the improvement of performance than the reduction of support and 
TOC.  Other significant findings were that PBL constructions often included short 
term contracts, unstable program requirements and funding, and lack of cost 
metrics and/or cost reduction incentives.  The GAO considers that such 
construction characteristics reduce the potential for TOC reduction.  In order to 
draw useful insight, the GAO examined and made a comparison with 
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arrangements similar to PBL, called availability contracts, which the United 
Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MOD) uses.  The main points of the 
comparison is that the UK MOD uses arrangements similar to PBL to support 
subsystems and equipment rather than entire weapon systems, the respective 
contracts are significantly longer than those of the DoD, and they constantly 
update the respective BCAs to oversee contractors and control costs.  According 
to the UK MOD, those availability contracts have met the objectives and have 
been beneficial.  Besides, private industry is interested in being involved in long-
term contracts for such programs.  The GAO recommended making BCA a 
required step before awarding a PBL contract, as well as during the PBL 
contract, and having clear guidance on how to use BCAs in the decision-making 
process.  The DoD concurred with the recommendations but disagreed with the 
GAO’s claim that the goal of PBL is to reduce cost.  DoD noted that “the primary 
goal of PBL arrangements is to increase readiness and availability while reducing 
overall sustainment costs in the long run” (Government Accountability Office, 
2008). 
Despite the GAO’s 2008 report, a few months earlier in the “2008 
Department of Defense Maintenance Symposium & Exhibition” all speakers 
representing the DoD, military agencies, and industry agreed on the success of 
PBL programs (Anderson, 2008), (Diaz, 2008), (Klevan, 2008), (Fowler, 2008).  
Substantial cost and performance benefits were presented by the Assistant 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Material Readiness (Fowler, 2008).  
These are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  However, no references regarding 
concerns and negative aspects, if any, were given. 
In a recent article published in Overhaul & Maintenance magazine (April 
2010, under the title “PBL pressure points” (Ott, 2010), the Assistant Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense Randy Fowler argues in favor of PBL programs, 
asserting that PBL programs have “demonstrated success.”  He recognizes that 
there are issues and there should be improvement in problematic areas after 
“fact-based analysis.”  For that reason, a new generation of PBL is currently 
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being developed.  Mr. Fowler identifies “system availability and readiness” as a 
metric of PBL goal achievement.  Key officials of private industry involved with 
PBL, such as General Electric Aviation, Boeing, and Raytheon agree that PBL is 
successful and beneficial for all parties.  However, they all identify the need for 
improvement in areas such as determination by the agency of the required 
performance and the increase of competition. 
Defense-oriented private sector companies are not the only companies 
recognizing the significance and potentials of PBL.  It is also recognized as a 
sound business-to business practice by the rest of the industry.  In the article 
“Vested Outsourcing: a Better Way to Outsource (2009),” based on research 
conducted with the University of Tennessee and the United Air Force, the 
authors analyze the conclusions of the research and describe the benefits of a 
practice almost identical to PBL, which they name vested outsourcing.  Vested 
outsourcing buys outcomes, not individual transactions.  The outcomes should 
be quantifiable and of different types such as availability, reliability, cost, revenue 
generation, and employee or customer satisfaction.  Metrics should be defined 
and ideally should be no more than five.  Also, other elements and details of this 
kind of approach are described.  Presenting examples of vested outsourcing the 
authors discussed the DoD’s PBL and claimed that the research they conducted 




Program Availability Benefits  Program Availability Benefits  Program Cycle Time Benefits 
F/A-18 +23%; 98% RFT  B-2 47.2% MC (Record Level)  F/A-18 -74% LRT; -33% RTAT 
F/A-18 SMS +32%  E-8 99.5% Lch Rt; 97.6% ME  F/A-18 SMS -84% LRT 
H-60 Avionics +14%  ALR-67(v)3 97% Avail  H-60 Avionics -85% LRT 
Navy Tires +17%  Sentinel 95% Avail  Navy Tires -92% LRT; -100% B/O’s 
AEGIS +30%  Shadow   APUs -82% LRT 
F-404 Engine +46%  TAIS 96%+ OR  LANTRIN -90% LRT 
T-700 +35%  Javelin 98%+ Avail  F-404 Engine -25% RTAT 
CIWS +9%  ITAS 99%+ OR  T-700 -74% RTAT; -100% B/O’s 
Mk41 VLS +8%  CGS 99% Avail  AH-64 Apache -35% RTAT 
Sea Sparrow +14%  HIMARS 98.7% Avail  Pegasus 
Engine 
-59% RTAT 
Navy Spt Equip +32%  C-17 93.5% Dpt Rel; 85.4% MC  CH-47 (UK) -44% RTAT 
Nimrod (UK) +40%  C-17 Engines 70% TOW incr  F-22 -20% RTAT 
AN/ALQ-126B +50%  T56-15 Engines +35% TOW  B-2 -20% RTAT (Depot) 
AN/USM-638 +40%  APS-137 +40% TOW  CIWS -99% B/O’s 
LANTRIN +17%  AN/PPS-14 95% Eff. Rate  Sea Sparrow -90% B/O’s 
EA-6B Flt Cont +47%  F-414 Engine 97% Avail  F-404 -66% B/O’s 
F-22 +15% MC     Patriot -99% B/O’s 
      RFTLTS -96% B/O’s 
 
RFT: Ready for Tasking;  MC: Mission Capable;  OR: Operational Readiness;  ME: Mission Effectiveness;  TOW: Time-on-Wing; 
B/O’s: Backorders;  LRT: Logistics Response Time;  RTAT: Repair Turnaround Time 
Table 3.   PBL Availability Benefits  (After: Fowler, 2008)  
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Program Total Cost Benefit ($M)  Program Total Cost Benefit ($M)  Program Annual Cost Benefit ($M) 
F-22 $14,000  ARC-210 $5.4 (8.6%)  F-22 $500 (39%) 
ALR-67(v)3 $62.7 (40%)  TH-57 $15.3 (7.9%)  CASS CSP $30 (54%) 
TOW-ITAS $350  H-60 $41 (6.5%)  TOW-ITAS $6.3 (34.5%) 
F/A-18 $688  Sea Sparrow $2.2 (6.3%)  ARCI $4 (24.7%) 
CGS $10.3 (65%)  AN/WSN-7 $0.88 (1.3%)  Mk41 VLS $1.1 (16.4%) 
MIDs-LVT $62 (54%)  AN-PSS14 $17  F-117 $124 (14.5%) 
AN/AAS-44 $31 (25.2%)  Sentinel $301.7  Navy Tires $46 (15%) 
APUs $4 (20.9%)  T-45 $85  GBMD $1.6 
AEGIS FCS $8 (19.3%)  C-17 $477  TAIS $0.01 
F-405 Engine $61 (17.2%)  Navy Spt Equip $1  H-46 $0.35 
Cockpit Disp. $71 (16.5%)  AN/ALQ-126B $2.1  
Program 
Flying Hour Cost 
Reduction F-100 $2 (16.3%)  AN/USM-638 $0.5  
AH-64 & CCAD $100  C-17 59%  LANTRIN $9.6 (14.6%) 
CH-47 (UK) $250  Tornado (UK) 51%  F-404 Engine $79 (13.4%) 
Javelin 10%  Harrier (UK) 44%  F-414 Engine $6.4 
RFTLTS $0.5  Nimrod (UK) 8%  Patriot $1 (13.1%) 
        
        
Table 4.   PBL Cost Benefit  (After: Fowler, 2008) 
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C. THE ROLE OF MODELING AND SIMULATION IN PBL/ LAV-25 CASE 
The discussion and analysis on the DoD indicates that PBL would achieve 
better results if it was implemented at a subsystem or component level.  
However, what really matters to the warfighter is the operational availability of the 
weapon system (Kang, Doerr, Boudreau, & Apte, 2005).  Evidently, the expected 
outcomes of component levels should be linked and their compound effect in the 
weapon system and the attributes that are of great concern for the warfighter 
should be determined.  This can be achieved by using modeling and simulation 
(M&S).  The warfighter, as well as the decision makers in various tiers of 
command, such as the base command level (expeditionary force), major 
command level, and acquisition authority level, can utilize the integrated outcome 
of an M&S model to make decisions throughout the entire spectrum of the life 
cycle framework.  In Designing and Assessing Supportability in DoD Weapon 
Systems: a Guide to Increased Reliability and Reduced Logistics Footprint 
(2003), it is indicated that M&S should be “vigorously applied” in the acquisition 
process. 
As the complexity of systems and at the same time the complexity of the 
desired outcomes increase, the call for a tool that will provide the warfighter with 
the “big picture”, incorporating crucial for the mission elements, is getting bigger.  
The DoD’s objectives are complex, related to the mission, and differ from the 
objectives of the business world (return on investment, profit, etc).  Thus, it is 
difficult for a decision maker to evaluate all inputs, parameters, and risks to make 
a sound decision.  As Doerr, Eaton, and Lewis (2005) point out,  
unless decision makers have comprehensive models of weapon-
systems logistics, (in which the important performance dimensions 
of all critical components are modeled), they cannot value a 
component-level contract in terms of system-level outcomes like 




The same research also finds that there is a need for DoD “to require 
comprehensive system-level models to value and price component-level 
contracts, and evaluate component-level logistics-service provider performance” 
(Doerr et al., 2005). 
The DoD’s objectives are different than private businesses’ goals, as the 
incentives are totally different.  Although the outcome of the mission is probably 
the most significant objective, the cost to achieve the outcome is of high 
importance as well.  Resources are limited and have to be spread among many 
diverse requirements.  Thus, the M&S should be applied in a way that will 
provide helpful insight for both the performance and TOC.  In the basic elements 
of M&S the essential metrics of PBL should be addressed.  The desired results 
should be in terms of performance, such as Ao, and how they impact TOC. 
Models in PBL can be used for both existing and future systems to support 
BCAs.  In existing systems, PBL can be utilized to evaluate proposed changes 
for improvements in relation with the desired outcome, which may differ in 
different situations.  In future systems, PBL can be utilized in the design of the 
system and help to define trade-offs in man-power, reliability, availability, 
maintainability, and alternate maintenance concepts and their effects on 
supportability (Office of Secretary of Defense, 2003).  Also, PBL can be used to 
identify the requirements of logistic resources, forecast readiness, and can 
determine the optimum mix of spare parts and maintenance.  Furthermore, PBL 
can assist decisions regarding the trade-off between TOC and Ao. 
In Chapter II, the importance of Ao as a performance measure was 
discussed.  Ao is the most important metric for PBL implementation.  
Concurrently, readiness risk (the probability that Ao will be achieved) was 
discussed.  Readiness risk is important for decision-making purposes.  
Accordingly, it should be an element of a simulation model regarding life cycle 
management.  The model should indicate how changes in the required readiness 
risk impact TOC. 
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This project adapts two models from Kang et al. (2009)–-an Arena 
simulation model and an Excel spreadsheet model–-for studying the LAV-25 
case.  The inputs are subsystem factors while the outcomes are Ao, readiness 
risk, and the impact in TOC, with the assumptions discussed in Chapter III.  TOC 
in the LAV-25 study case is essentially the total LCC that this project has used, 
as was explained in Chapter II.  In case four, the model keeps the following 
factors stable: turnaround time (TAT), number of spares in the spare inventory, 
and Op-Tempo; the authors then change the failure rates λ of the components 
that were identified by this project as the most critical ones.  In case five, the 
model keeps the following factors stable: number of spares in the spare inventory 
and Op-Tempo; this time, the authors change the failure rates λ of the 
components and turnaround time (TAT).  Actually, cases four and five are the 
investigation of different alternatives for potential PBL contracts regarding those 
components.  Various levels of Ao and readiness risk will indicate the required 
failure rate.  The impact on TOC could help the decision maker to evaluate the 
trade-offs between performance and cost, and drive the decisions for PBL 
agreements.  This particular case, as a study, is discussed in two parts (cases 
four and five) that are described in the following chapter. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The total ownership cost of weapon systems is currently a point of great 
concern for the DoD.  A total life cycle systems management approach has been 
directed in order to optimize the performance of a system, and the same time 
minimize TOC.  Logistics have a great contribution to TOC especially in the 
sustainment phase of a system’s life cycle.  PBL has been identified by the DoD 
as a tool that will help control and minimize the logistics impact in TOC, providing 
the desired performance while reducing costs. 
Performance-based logistics focuses on the outcome, rather than how to 
achieve the desired outcome.  This approach makes the acquisition process 
more agile.  PBL has been implemented in over 200 weapon system programs in 
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at a system, subsystem, or component level.  In many of those programs, some 
substantial benefits have been recorded.  Private industry seems to embrace 
PBL as a business practice, and except for the DoD acquisitions, is implementing 
it into business-to-business acquisitions.  PBL can be implemented in both 
legacy and new design systems.  The DoD explicitly indicates that “the primary 
goal of PBL arrangements is to increase readiness and availability while reducing 
overall sustainment costs in the long run” (Government Accountability Office, 
2008). 
The implementation of PBL has not been trouble free, and some ambiguity 
exists.  The first significant finding of research conducted regarding PBL is that 
PBL is successful when implemented in a sub-system or component level rather 
than the entire system.  The second finding is that the establishment of 
appropriate metrics linked to the required outcomes is fundamental for 
determining the level of PBL agreement effectiveness and whether it is better 
than the traditional approach.  The third finding is that PBL is an approach that 
works and can give the desired results; inappropriate implementation is the 
reason for PBL shortcomings. 
The most important metric that is in a warfighter’s center of interest is 
operational availability (Ao).  Ao is easier to measure in the subsystem or 
component level.  The warfighter and the decision maker can be assisted better if 
provided with the compound effect of all the subsystems or/and components.  A 
tool for getting those compound effects is M&S.  Such models can provide 
comprehensive results, having taken into account all the established metrics for 
each individual subsystem or component.  M&S will provide the warfighter and 
the decision maker a basis for deciding on trade-offs between performance and 
cost.  In addition, M&S can be utilized to evaluate various solution options.  
Finally, M&S can offer useful insight regarding logistic support during the whole 
acquisition cycle.  A well-developed model can be proven to be a great tool for 
improvement or requirements modifications during the life of the system. 
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In the next chapter, the model developed for the LAV-25 study case is 
discussed.  Case three is orientated in assisting decisions regarding PBL 
arrangements, either new ones or modifications. 
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V. LAV-25 CASE STUDY: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS  
In this chapter, an initial Baseline Case will be used to calculate the Ao, 
readiness risk, and LCC for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with 76 LAV-25 
vehicles and a life cycle of 20 years.  The input data is based on failures rates (λi) 
for the five components (given in Table 1), a value range for the number of 
spares in the spare inventory, and maintenance turnaround times for an Op-
Tempo that has a normal distribution with a mean of 500 and standard deviation 
of 60 hours per year (99.7% of the values are between a range of 300-700 
hours)14. 
In the first part of the analysis, the authors assume that they cannot 
change the failure rates (λi) for the five critical components selected for the case 
study.  The authors have procured the systems with the initial specifications on 
the failure rates, so they cannot change them.  Also, they assume that they 
cannot change the mean Op-Tempo either.  If the authors want to improve the 
components’ failure rates (lower values), they will need a new acquisition 
contract.  This will be the second part of the analysis, namely the cost benefit 
analysis between the two options of buying new improved components or 
improving the maintenance turnaround time (TAT).  
Having the input and output results, the authors try to realize which of the 
input factors have the greater impact on Ao, readiness risk, and LCC.  The 
authors will correlate all these data, present the results, and analyze the 
alternatives.  
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A.  BASELINE CASE 
For the Baseline Case, the authors use the input data as following (Table 
5): 
 
Input Parameter (factors) 
Input Values 
(generate random values) 
Failure rate for component i 
(λi,  i = 1, 2, …, 5) 
The reciprocal of the Poisson random variates 
generated with the mean displayed in column 4 
of Table 6 
Number of spares in the spare inventory 
for the component i ( i = 1, 2, …, 5) 
Normal distribution with mean (μ) =5 spares and 
standard deviation (σ)=1.5 spares (5, 1.5) 







 Echelon turnaround time) 
Normal distribution (7.5, 2.5) in days, 







 Echelon turnaround time) 
Normal distribution (60, 10) in days, 
(99.7% of the values are between a range  
30-90 days) 
Op-Tempo 
Normal distribution (500, 60) in operational 
hours per year, (99.7% of the values are 
between a range 300-700 op. hours). 
Table 5.   Values of Input Parameters for Baseline Case 
                                            
14 Dark blue is less than one standard deviation (σ) from the mean (μ).  For the normal 
distribution, this accounts for about 68% of the set (dark blue), while two standard deviations from 
the mean (medium and dark blue) account for about 95%, and three standard deviations (light, 
medium, and dark blue) account for about 99.7% 
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According to the data from Table 1, the data for the failure rate were 
provided as the number of failures per million days, which is too low.  Even using 
one calendar day as a time unit, the failure rates still remain too low, or the 
components are unusually too reliable.  Instead of the failures per million days in 
their project, the authors will use the provided data as failures per calendar hour.  
Since the failure rate still remains low, the authors will generate failures per 
operating hours, keeping the same proportionality between components’ failures 











Mean Time between 
Operating hours 
Failure rate 
per op. hour 
λi 
1 0.00021 4725.05 196.88 0.0051 
2 0.00036 2752.45 114.68 0.0087 
3 0.00009 11227.84 467.83 0.0021 
4 0.00011 9145.26 381.05 0.0026 
5 0.00012 7875.08 328.13 0.0030 
Table 6.   Expected Frequency of Component Failure Rates 
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The Excel spreadsheet model uses as inputs the following data (Table 7): 
Input Parameter for Excel 
Spreadsheet 
Input Values 
(Any of these values can be 
modified by the user) 
Number of weapon systems 76 
Life cycle period 20 years 
Hourly operating cost $100 
Hourly repair cost, including  
material cost 
$300 
Transportation cost per failure $200 
Annual discount rate 7% 
Annual inventory rate 20% 
Protection Level for Critical 
Components 
0.95 
Table 7.   Input Values for the Excel Spreadsheet Model 
The results (Ao and LCC) from the Baseline Case scenarios are 











The mean Ao=0.63 with maximum 
Ao=0.84 and minimum Ao=0.5. The 
mean Ao is much lower than the target 
mean Ao of 0.85. 
 
Figure 11.   Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for the Baseline Case 
Ao descriptive statistic  
Baseline Case (for 20 years) 
  
Mean 0.63 
Standard Error 0.004 
Median 0.63 




Scenarios Count 257 
Ao Histogram 






The mean LCC=$84.04 million with 
maximum LCC=$111.58 million and 








Figure 12.   LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for the Baseline Case 
Using the distribution of Ao values, the authors can extract the quantiles of 
Ao (in this case they will be 55%, 60%, 65%,..., 95%, 100% of Ao).  The 
cumulative Ao is illustrated in Figure 13.  The authors can note that the 
probability that the Ao falls below 0.55 is 10.51%.  The probability that the Ao 
falls below 0.75 is 93% (the probability that the Ao is above 0.75 is only 17%).  
This is a high readiness risk at the threshold Ao of 75%, in accordance with the 
authors' target in Chapter III. 
LCC in $ million (for 20 years)  
  
Mean 84.04 
Standard Error 0.63 
Median 84.12 
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LCC Histogram 










0.50 0 0.00% 
0.55 27 10.51% 
0.60 58 33.07% 
0.65 64 57.98% 
0.70 64 82.88% 
0.75 26 93.00% 
0.80 14 98.44% 
0.85 4 100.00% 
0.90 0 100.00% 
 
 
Figure 13.   Ao's Quantiles and the Cumulative Operational Availability for the 
Baseline Case 
Using the correlation data (Table 8) between the inputs and outputs value, 
the authors will analyze which of the input values have more influence on Ao and 
LCC. The factors that are most influential for Ao in order of precedence are the 
4th echelon TAT (as the 4th echelon TAT increases, the Ao value decreases and 
vice versa), Op-Tempo, number of spares for component 1 (sensor unit, laser) 
in the spare pool, and the number of spares for component 5 (engine, diesel) in 
the spare pool.  All other factors have a minor impact on Ao.  The factors that are 
most influential for LCC in order of precedence are the Op-Tempo and failure 
rate of component 2 (control display unit). 
In accordance with the above results, the authors will try to improve the Ao 
and reduce the readiness risk using another two cases.  In Case One, the 
authors will reduce the 4th echelon TAT to a mean of 45 days with a standard 
deviation of 4.5 days following the normal distribution (99.7% of the values are 
between 31.5 and 58.5 days).  In Case Two, the authors will reduce the 4th 
echelon TAT to a mean of 30 days with a standard deviation of 4.5 days following 
a normal distribution (99.7% of the values are between 16.5 and 43.5 days). 
Cumulative Operation Availability 
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    Input – Output Values Correlation     
 




hours/year     





Op tempo Ao LCC 
λ1 1               
λ2 -0.03376 1              
λ3 -0.17552 0.001272 1             
λ4 0.090261 -0.09214 0.09614 1            
λ5 0.044352 -0.02036 -0.01274 0.066391 1           
spare 1 -0.05929 0.003439 0.01349 0.012255 -0.02088 1          
spare 2 0.01756 -0.05588 -0.00777 -0.03592 -0.05576 -0.04283 1         
spare 3 -0.10946 -0.09229 -0.00777 0.000616 -0.01766 -0.00789 0.066657 1        
spare 4 -0.03187 0.036631 0.058836 -0.01385 0.037114 0.045637 -0.00587 -0.02635 1       
spare 5 0.001369 0.04215 0.02098 -0.03192 -0.05403 -0.00529 0.149273 -0.0584 -0.0109 1      
3rd 
echelon 
0.030175 -0.07747 0.033213 -0.00981 0.022414 0.083675 -0.05953 0.061468 0.072211 -0.16543 1     
4th 
echelon 
0.049821 0.040262 -0.04692 -0.00501 -0.00865 -0.09263 0.012036 -0.11281 -0.04546 -0.07618 0.042226245 1    
Tempo 
 
-0.06475 0.016705 0.016163 -0.03088 0.026733 -0.00923 -0.04535 -0.07125 0.026322 0.013286 -0.02273037 0.00549725 1   
Ao 
 
-0.165 -0.04276 0.057197 -0.03824 -0.09614 0.27063 0.098817 0.116188 0.19149 0.230339 -0.06459197 -0.76712909 -0.520721 1  
LCC 
 
0.011142 0.100795 0.051412 -0.00987 0.04835 0.020793 -0.04018 -0.08163 0.048151 0.028931 -0.02223527 0.004319335 0.99075815 -0.518516 1 
                
Order of 
preceden
ce  for Ao 
influence  
6     3  7 5 4  1 2   
Order of 
preceden
ce  for 
LCC 
influence 
 3           1 2  
Table 8.   Input–Output Values Correlation 
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B. PART ONE – CASE ONE (4TH ECHELON TAT N(45, 4.5)) 
For Case One, the authors use the input data from the Table 2, except 4th 
echelon TATs, which are:  
4
th
 Echelon-TAT for Case One 
Normal distribution (45, 4.5 ) in 
days, (99.7% of the values are 
between a range  
31.5-58.5 days) 
The results (Ao, LCC, readiness risk and the cumulative operational 
availability) from the Case One scenarios are represented in histograms with 









The mean Ao=0.73 (better than 
the Basiline Case of Ao=0.63) with 
maximum Ao=0.83 and minimum 
Ao=0.56. The mean Ao has improved 




Figure 14.   Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case One 
Ao descriptive statistic  
Case One (for 20 years) 
  
Mean 0.70 
Standard Error 0.003 
Median 0.70 




Scenarios Count 257 
Ao Histogram 
4th echelon TAT: N(45, 4.5) days 
59 
The LCC distribution does not significantly change as compared to the 
Baseline Case (the product of the average repair time multiplied by the hourly 









0.50 0 0.00% 
0.55 0 0.00% 
0.60 4 1.56% 
0.65 22 10.12% 
0.70 98 48.25% 
0.75 80 79.38% 
0.80 40 94.94% 
0.85 13 100.00% 
0.90 0 100.00% 
 
 
Figure 15.   Ao's Quantiles and the Cumulative Operational Availability for Case 
One 
The probability that the Ao falls below 0.75 is 79.38% (the probability that 
the Ao is above 0.75 is only 20.62%), as seen in Figure 15.  This still remains a 
high readiness risk for the threshold Ao of 75%, in accordance with the authors' 
target in Chapter III. 
Cumulative Operation Availability 
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C. PART ONE – CASE TWO (4TH ECHELON TAT N(30, 4.5)) 
For Case Two, the authors use the input data from Table 2, except 4th 
echelon TATs, which are:  
4
th
 Echelon-TAT for Case Two 
Normal distribution (30, 4.5 ) in 
days, (99.7% of the values are 
between a range  
16.5-43.5 days) 
The results (Ao, LCC, readiness risk and the cumulative operational 
availability) from the Case Two scenarios are represented in histograms with 








The mean Ao=0.81 (better 
than the Baseline Case mean 
Ao=0.63, and Case One mean 
Ao=.73) with maximum Ao=0.97 and 
minimum Ao=0.67.  The Ao has 
significantly improved and it is close 
to the target mean Ao of 0.85. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Two 
Ao descriptive statistic  
Case Two (for 20 years) 
  
Mean 0.81 
Standard Error 0.003 
Median 0.81 




Scenarios Count 257 
Ao Histogram 









0.60 0 0.00% 
0.65 0 0.00% 
0.70 7 2.72% 
0.75 27 13.23% 
0.80 77 43.19% 
0.85 88 77.43% 
0.90 51 97.28% 
0.95 6 99.61% 
1.00 1 100.00% 
 
 
Figure 17.   Ao's Quantiles and the Cumulative Operational Availability for Case 
Two 
As can be seen in Figure 17, the probability that the Ao falls below 0.75 is 
13.23%.  There is improvement in readiness risk close to the threshold set for 
this report (Prob [Ao < 0.75] < 0.10). 
D. PART ONE – CASE THREE (INCREASE NUMBER OF SPARES IN THE 
SPARE INVENTORY: N(15, 1.2) SPARES FOR COMPONENT 1 OR 
COMPONENT 5) 
Using the correlation data from the Baseline Case (Table 8) between the 
input and output values, the authors will try to further improve the Ao by changing 
the numbers of spares in the inventory from N(5, 1.5) to N(15, 1.2), for spares of 
component 1 and of component 5 alternatively (either spares for component 1 or 
spares for component 5 were changed, but not simultaneously).  In accordance 
with the correlation table (Table 8), the number of spares in the inventory for 
components 1 and 5 are the factors with the 3rd and 4th highest impact on Ao.  
For Case Three, the authors will use the input data from Case Two (4th echelon 
TAT: N(30, 4.5)), except the number of spares in the spare inventory for 
component 1 and component 5 as they are shown below in Figure 18:  




Figure 18.   Values of Input Parameters for Case Three 
The results (Ao, readiness risk, cumulative operational availability and 
LCC) from the Case Three scenarios are represented in histograms with their 






Input Parameter (factors) 
Input Values 
(generate random values) 
Failure rate for the component i 
(λi,  i = 1, 2, …, 5) 
The reciprocal of the Poisson 
random variates generated with 
the mean displayed in column 4 of 
Table 6 
Number of spares in the spare inventory for 
the component i ( i = 2, 3, 4) 
Normal distribution with mean (μ) 
=5 spares and standard deviation 
(σ)=1.5 spares (5, 1.5) 
Number of spares in the spare inventory first 
for the component 1 and then for the 
component 5 (separately) 
Normal distribution with mean (μ) 
=15 spares and standard 
deviation (σ)=1.3 spares 
(15,1.3)  (99.7% of the values 







 Echelon turnaround time) 







 Echelon turnaround time) 
Normal distribution (30, 4.5) in 
days 
Op-Tempo 














Figure 19.   Ao Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Three (Increase 
Number of Spares: N(15, 1.2) in the Spare 1 and Spare 5 Inventories) 
The authors can observe that the Ao distributions between the two sub-
cases have a small difference (mean Ao=0.87 and 0.83 respectively), with a 
Ao descriptive statistic (Spare 1 
inventory: N(15, 1.2) spares) 
  
Mean 0.87 
Standard Error 0.003 
Median 0.87 




Scenarios Count 257 
Ao descriptive statistic (Spare 
5 inventory: N(15, 1.2) spares) 
  
Mean 0.83 
Standard Error 0.003 
Median 0.84 




Scenarios Count 257 
Ao Histogram 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 
spare 1 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
Ao Histogram 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 
spare 5 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
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small Ao advantage by increasing the spare inventory of component 1. For both 
sub-cases, the mean Ao=0.87 and 0.83 are better than the Baseline Case (mean 
Ao=0.63), Case One (mean Ao=.73), and Case Two (mean Ao=0.81) with 
maximum Ao=0.97-0.99 and minimum Ao=0.72-0.73. There is an aditional 
improvement in Ao by increasing the spare inventory. The better option for the 
Ao between the two inventories (spare 1 and 5) is to increase the spare 1 








































0.70 0 0.00% 
0.75 11 4.28% 
0.80 45 21.79% 
0.85 99 60.31% 
0.90 90 95.33% 
0.95 11 99.61% 








0.60 0 0.00% 
0.65 0 0.00% 
0.70 0 0.00% 
0.75 3 1.17% 
0.80 16 7.39% 
0.85 58 29.96% 
0.90 108 71.98% 
0.95 64 96.89% 
1.00 8 100.00% 
Cumulative Operation Availability 
spare 5 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
Cumulative Operation Availability 
spare 1 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
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The probability that the Ao falls below 0.75 is only 1.17% and 4.28%, 
respectively.  There is a significant improvement of readiness risk when the 
authors increase the spare 1 inventory number (Figure 20).  From the above 
analysis, the authors would prefer to increase the spare 1 inventory instead of 
the spare 5 inventory, because it gives a higher mean Ao and a lower readiness 
risk. 
As can be seen in Figure 21, the mean LCC is slightly increased (mean 
LCC=$85.83 million and $84.59 million, respectively, for the two sub-cases) in 
comparison with Cases One and Two (mean LCC=$84.04 million for Case One 
and Two). 
The authors can achieve an increase in mean Ao by 6% (from 0.81 to 
0.87) and at the same time decrease the readiness risk (probability that the mean 
Ao falls below 0.75) from 13.23% to less than 5% with a small additional cost 








LCC in $ million (Spare 5 
inventory:N(15, 1.2) spares) 
  
Mean 84.59 
Standard Error 0.63 
Median 84.66 




Scenarios Count 257 
Figure 21.   LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Three (Increase 
Number of Spares: N(15, 1.2) in the Spare 1 or Spare 5 Inventory) 
LCC in $ million (Spare 1 
inventory:N(15, 1.2) spares) 
   
Mean 85.83 
Standard Error 0.63 
Median 85.79 




Scenarios Count 257 
LCC Histogram: number of spare 1 in the 
inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
LCC Histogram: number of spare 5 in the 
inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
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E. ASSESSMENT FOR PART ONE (CASES ONE THROUGH THREE): 
IMPROVE TAT VERSUS INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SPARES IN 
INVENTORY 
In comparing the results from Figures 22 and 23, the most significant 
factor in Ao improvement is the reduction in TAT.  From the readiness risk 
assessment in Table 9 and the comparison chart (Figure 24), it is obvious that 
there is an incremental improvement in readiness risk.  The most influential 
factor, as in Ao improvement, is the TAT.  By Increasing only the number of 
spares in the spare inventory, there is almost no change in readiness risk (the 
detailed data and output results from this case are not shown here).  A 
combination of a reduced TAT with an increase in the number of spares in the 
spare inventory further improves results for the readiness risk (Case Three). 
The LCC distribution remains almost the same for Cases One, Two, and 
Three (Figure 25).  It is slightly increased in Case Three in comparison with the 
Baseline Case, as well as Cases One and Two.  The authors can achieve (case 
three) an increase in mean Ao by 6% and at the same time a decrease in the 
readiness risk (probability that the mean Ao falls below 0.75), from 13.23% to 

















TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 
Case Three (i) 
Ao Histogram 
4th echelon 
TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 
spare 1: N(15, 1.2) 
Case Three (ii) 
Ao Histogram 
4th echelon 
TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 




Figure 23.   Ao Distribution Chart – Case Comparison for Part One 
 
4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(45, 4.5) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spare 1 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spare 5 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
Ao 
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TAT:  N(60, 10) 
days 
Case One  
4th echelon 




TAT:  N(30, 4.5) 
days 
Case Three (i) 
TAT:  N(30, 4.5) 
days 
spare 1 inventory: 
N(15, 1.2) spares 
Case Three (ii) 
TAT:  N(30, 4.5) 
days 
spare 5 inventory: 
N(15, 1.2) spares 
Ao Freq. Cum. Ao Freq. Cum. Ao Freq. Cum. Ao Freq. Cum. Ao Freq. Cum. Ao 
0.50 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.51 5 1.95% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.52 2 2.72% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.53 5 4.67% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.54 4 6.23% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.55 11 10.51% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.56 8 13.62% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.57 6 15.95% 2 0.78% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.58 11 20.23% 0 0.78% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.59 18 27.24% 1 1.17% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.60 15 33.07% 1 1.56% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.61 15 38.91% 4 3.11% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.62 12 43.58% 2 3.89% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.63 14 49.03% 3 5.06% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.64 10 52.92% 3 6.23% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.65 13 57.98% 10 10.12% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.66 16 64.20% 12 14.79% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.67 14 69.65% 26 24.90% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.68 17 76.26% 21 33.07% 1 0.39% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.69 7 78.99% 18 40.08% 2 1.17% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.70 10 82.88% 21 48.25% 4 2.72% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.71 6 85.21% 15 54.09% 4 4.28% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.72 6 87.55% 11 58.37% 3 5.45% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.73 3 88.72% 17 64.98% 7 8.17% 1 0.39% 4 1.56% 
0.74 4 90.27% 19 72.37% 6 10.51% 0 0.39% 4 3.11% 
0.75 7 93.00% 18 79.38% 7 13.23% 2 1.17% 3 4.28% 
0.76 3 94.16% 8 82.49% 14 18.68% 4 2.72% 7 7.00% 
0.77 3 95.33% 9 85.99% 8 21.79% 2 3.50% 8 10.12% 
0.78 4 96.89% 9 89.49% 19 29.18% 1 3.89% 12 14.79% 
0.79 3 98.05% 9 93.00% 22 37.74% 3 5.06% 11 19.07% 
0.80 1 98.44% 5 94.94% 14 43.19% 6 7.39% 7 21.79% 
0.81 0 98.44% 5 96.89% 20 50.97% 8 10.51% 21 29.96% 
0.82 2 99.22% 5 98.83% 16 57.20% 10 14.40% 21 38.13% 
0.83 1 99.61% 1 99.22% 17 63.81% 14 19.84% 16 44.36% 
0.84 0 99.61% 2 100.00% 14 69.26% 10 23.74% 20 52.14% 
0.85 1 100.00% 0 100.00% 21 77.43% 16 29.96% 21 60.31% 
0.86 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 14 82.88% 27 40.47% 16 66.54% 
0.87 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 14 88.33% 17 47.08% 19 73.93% 
0.88 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 11 92.61% 23 56.03% 21 82.10% 
0.89 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 8 95.72% 20 63.81% 20 89.88% 
0.90 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 4 97.28% 21 71.98% 14 95.33% 
0.91 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 3 98.44% 17 78.60% 5 97.28% 
0.92 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 1 98.83% 14 84.05% 2 98.05% 
0.93 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 2 99.61% 16 90.27% 1 98.44% 
0.94 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 99.61% 9 93.77% 2 99.22% 
0.95 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 99.61% 8 96.89% 1 99.61% 
0.96 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 99.61% 3 98.05% 0 99.61% 
0.97 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 1 100.00% 3 99.22% 1 100.00% 
0.98 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 1 99.61% 0 100.00% 
0.99 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 1 100.00% 0 100.00% 
1.00 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 
Table 9.   Readiness Risk Assessment Table for Part One 
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Figure 24.   Readiness Risk Chart - Case Comparison for Part One 
 
 
4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(45, 4.5) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spare 5 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spare 1 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
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Figure 25.   LCC Distribution Chart – Case Comparison for Part One 
.
4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(45, 4.5) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spare 1 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spare 5 inventory: N(15, 1.2) 
LCC in $ million 
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F. PART TWO – CASE FOUR (DEMAND IMPROVED FAILURE RATE FOR 
COMPONENT 1 OR FOR ALL THE FIVE COMPONENTS) 
Case Four uses the same input data as the Baseline Case (Table 5), 
except for the failure rates.  Three distinct sub-cases are created.  In sub-cases 
(i) and (ii), the mean failure rate of component 1 (sensor unit, laser) are improved 
from λ=0.005 to λ=0.0033 and λ=0.0025, respectively.  In sub-case (iii), the 
failure rates of all five components are changed to λ=0.0025. 
The results (Ao, readiness risk, cumulative operational availability, and 
LCC) from the Case Four sub-cases are displayed in the histograms with their 











     
Mean 0.64 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Standard Error 0.0044 0.0043 0.0042 0.0043 
Median 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.74 
Standard Deviation 0.070 0.069 0.067 0.068 
Range 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.34 
Minimum 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.60 
Maximum 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.94 
Scenarios Count 257 257 257 257 




Figure 27.   Ao Distribution Charts for Case Four Sub-cases 
 
Baseline Case 
Ao Histogram λ1=0.005 
Case Four (i) 
Ao Histogram λ1=0.0033 
Case Four (ii) 
Ao Histogram λ1=0.0025 
Case Four (iii) 
Ao Histogram λi=0.0025 
i=1,2,3,4,5 
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For all these sub-cases, there is improvement (Figure 27) for mean Ao 
(mean Ao=0.69, 0.72, and 0.75, respectively) in comparison with the Baseline 
Case (mean Ao value of 0.63), but the readiness risk still remains below the 
threshold Ao of 75% (Figure 28). 
 


























0.40 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.45 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.50 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.55 27 10.51% 1 0.39% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.60 58 33.07% 27 10.89% 10 3.89% 0 0.00% 
0.65 64 57.98% 51 30.74% 35 17.51% 16 6.23% 
0.70 64 82.88% 66 56.42% 67 43.58% 42 22.57% 
0.75 26 93.00% 67 82.49% 68 70.04% 75 51.75% 
0.80 14 98.44% 28 93.39% 49 89.11% 62 75.88% 
0.85 4 100.00% 13 98.44% 20 96.89% 39 91.05% 
0.90 0 100.00% 4 100.00% 8 100.00% 19 98.44% 
0.95 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 4 100.00% 
1.00 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 
Figure 28.   Readiness Risk for Case Four Sub-cases 
Baseline Case: λ1=0.005 
Case Four (i): λ1=0.0033 
Case Four (ii): λ1=0.0025 








Figure 29.   LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Four 
Sub-cases 
Baseline Case (in $ million ) 
Mean 84.05 
Standard Error 0.63 
Median 84.12 




Scenarios Count 257 
Case Four (i) (in $ million ) 
Mean 79.70 
Standard Error 0.60 
Median 79.69 




Scenarios Count 257 
Case Four (ii) (in $ million) 
Mean 77.63 
Standard Error 0.59 
Median 77.62 




Scenarios Count 257 
Case Four (iii) (in $ million) 
Mean 70.87 
Standard Error 0.53 
Median 70.60 




Scenarios Count 257 
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The LCC is incrementally reduced (Figure 29) from the Baseline Case and 
sub-case one through sub-case three (mean LCC in millions: 84.05, 79.7, 77.63, 
and 70.87 respectively). 
G. PART TWO – CASE FIVE (LOWER FAILURE RATE FOR CRITICAL 
COMPONENTS IN COMBINATION WITH CASE THREE) 
Case Five is a combination of Cases Three and Four.  Three sub-cases 
are created.  The input factor of 4th echelon TAT is set as in Case Three  
N(30, 4.5) days with N(15, 1.2) spares for component 1 in the spare inventory.  
Each sub-case uses the failure rates of the respective sub-cases, as in Case 
Four.  The failure rate of component 1 is improved from λ=0.005 to λ=0.0033 and 
λ=0.0025, respectively.  In sub-case (iii), the failure rates of all five components 
are changed to λ=0.0025. 
The results (Ao, readiness risk, cumulative operational availability, and 
LCC) from the Case Five sub-cases are represented in histograms with their 
descriptive statistics in Figures 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34. 
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Figure 30.   Ao Distribution Charts for Case Five Sub-cases 
Case Three (i) 
Ao Histogram 
λ1=0.005 
Case Five (i) 
Ao Histogram 
λ1=0.0033 
Case Five (ii) 
Ao Histogram 
λ1=0.0025 














     
Mean 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.93 
Standard Error 0.0030 0.0027 0.0026 0.0021 
Median 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.93 
Standard Deviation 0.048 0.043 0.042 0.033 
Range 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.18 
Minimum 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.81 
Maximum 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Scenarios Count 257 257 257 257 
Figure 31.   Ao Descriptive Statistics for Case Five Sub-cases 
For sub-cases (i) and (ii), there is slight improvement for mean Ao (mean 
Ao=0.88) in comparison with the Case Three sub-case (i) (mean Ao was 0.87).  
For the sub-case (iii), there is even further improvement, with mean Ao=0.93.  
The improvement in sub-case (iii) is significantly above the target mean Ao of 
0.85. 
 
Figure 32.   Readiness Risk Chart for Case Five Sub-cases 
Case Three (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.005 
Case Five (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0033 
Case Five (ii) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0025 
Case Five (iii) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λi=0.0025 
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0.40 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.45 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.50 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.55 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.60 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.65 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.70 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.75 3 1.17% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.80 16 7.39% 10 3.89% 10 3.89% 0 0.00% 
0.85 58 29.96% 38 18.68% 33 16.73% 7 2.72% 
0.90 108 71.98% 115 63.42% 120 63.42% 41 18.68% 
0.95 64 96.89% 82 95.33% 82 95.33% 140 73.15% 
1.00 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 0 100.00% 
Figure 33.   Readiness Risk for Case Five Sub-cases 
For all Case Five sub-cases, there is improvement to the readiness risk 
(the probability that Ao falls below 0.75 is 0%), with the better one in sub-case 
(iii) (the probability that Ao falls below 0.85 is only 2.72%).  
The LCC is incrementally reduced (Figure 34) from Case Three (i) to Case 
Five sub-cases (i), (ii) and (iii) (mean LCC is progressively reduced from $85.83 












Figure 34.   LCC Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Case Five 
Sub-cases 
Case Three(i) (in $ million ) 
Mean 85.83 
Standard Error 0.63 
Median 85.79 
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Case Five(i) (in $ million ) 
Mean 81.47 
Standard Error 0.60 
Median 81.57 




Scenarios Count 257 
Case Five(ii) (in $ million ) 
Mean 79.41 
Standard Error 0.59 
Median 79.46 




Scenarios Count 257 
Case Five(iii) (in $ million ) 
Mean 72.64 
Standard Error 0.53 
Median 72.69 




Scenarios Count 257 
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H. ASSESSMENT FOR PART TWO (CASES FOUR AND FIVE): PROCURE 
LOWER FAILURE RATES IN CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
The second part of the analysis examines and suggests alternative 
solutions before or during the system acquisition (PBL contracts) during the 
research and development (R&D) and investment phases, into the components’ 
failure rates (i.e., during the procurement or in a follow on support contract the 
acquisition team could negotiate a maximum threshold for the components failure 
rate, in order to achieve a maximum Ao during the weapon’s life cycle). 
From the Ao distribution assessment (Figure 35), and the results from 
Case Four and Case Five, it is proven that the most significant factor in Ao 
improvement remains the improvement in TAT.  By improving (reducing) only the 
failure rate (of one or of all the five components), only a slightly improvement in 
Ao and readiness risk is achieved, as they still remain below the threshold and 
target mean Ao the authors set for this report.  The same results are produced 
when only the number of spares is increased in the spare inventory.  A 
combination of a reduced TAT with a reduction in the failure rates and increase in 
the number of spares in the spare inventory (not for all, but only for the one or 
two critical components that are the most influential for the Ao) gives significantly 
better results for the mean Ao (Case Five).  
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Figure 35.   Ao Distribution Chart – Comparison for Part Two 
Baseline Case 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λ1=0.005 
Case Four (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λ1=0.0033 
Case Four (ii) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λ1=0.0025 
Case Four (iii) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λi=0.0025 (i=1,2,3,4,5) 
Case Three (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.005 
Case Five (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0033 
Case Five (ii) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0025 
Case Five (iii) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λi=0.0025 (i=1,2,3,4,5) 
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Figure 36.   Readiness Risk Chart – Cases Comparison for Part Two 
From the readiness risk assessment (Figure 36), it is obvious again that 
the most influential factor in Ao improvement is TAT.  By improving only the 
failure rate, or increasing the number of spares in the spare inventory, the 
authors succeeded only in obtaining a slight reduction in readiness risk.  Again, a 
combination of a reduced TAT with a reduced failure rate and increased number 
of spares in the spare inventory offers a significant reduction in readiness risk 
(Case Five sub-cases).  
  
Baseline Case 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 2), mean λ1=0.005 
Case Four (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 2), mean λ1=0.0033 
Case Four (ii) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 2), mean λ1=0.0025 
Case Four (iii) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 2), mean λi=0.0025 (i=1,2,3,4,5) 
Case Three (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.005 
Case Five (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0033 
Case Five (ii) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0025 




Figure 37.   LCC Distribution Chart – Cases Comparison for Part Two 
Baseline Case 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λ1=0.005 
Case Four (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λ1=0.0033 
Case Four (ii) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λ1=0.0025 
Case Four (iii) 4th echelon TAT: N(60, 10) days, spares N(5, 1.5), mean λi=0.0025 (i=1,2,3,4,5) 
Case Three (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.005 
Case Five (i) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0033 
Case Five (ii) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λ1=0.0025 
Case Five (iii) 4th echelon TAT: N(30, 4.5) days, spares N(15, 1.2), mean λi=0.0025 (i=1,2,3,4,5) 
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The reduction in the components’ failure rates results in an incremental 
reduction of the LCC, with a total reduction of more than 15% in O&S compared 
to the Baseline Case in Figures 29, 34 and 37.  The savings from LCC in terms 
of dollars would help determine the breakeven point for procuring reduced failure 
rates (it is worthy sacrificing an amount, which is less than the savings incurred 
by reduced LCC, for the procurement of components with decreased failure 
rates).  The acquisition team could negotiate a maximum threshold for the 
components’ failure rates, taking into account the saving in O&S cost.  At the he 
same time, they could achieve an improved weapon’s Ao for its life cycle, in 
conjunction with the other Ao components (e.g., TAT, number of spares in the 
spare inventory).  In the LAV-25 case study, the acquisition team could use $13 
million for the acquisition (PBL contact) of reduced failure rates (λi ≤ 0.0025) for 
the five components. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. MOTIVATION 
The ability of the United States Marine Corps to fight and meet the 
demands of the national military strategy depends on the operational availability 
(Ao) of its weapon systems and readiness risk (probability of achieving a 
threshold Ao).  Moreover, Ao has been integrated in the acquisition process 
(Department of Defense, 2009), affecting decision making.  The intention of the 
DoD and the commercial defense industry is to improve weapons system Ao and 
readiness risk, while at the same time, reducing the total life cycle cost.  
This report utilized, as a test platform, the Light Armored Vehicle equipped 
with a 25mm Gun System (LAV-25), currently employed by the USMC.  The 
modeling scenarios included 76 LAV-25s normally deployed with a Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) for a life cycle of 20 years, and examined possible 
alternatives to determine how Ao, readiness risk, and total LCC are affected.  
This process allowed the authors to identify the total LCC needed for the USMC 
to maintain specific Ao and readiness risk. 
This report provided warfighters and logistics teams the ability to 
determine which of the Ao’s synthetic parameters are more sensitive in terms of 
maintaining specific levels of mean Ao and readiness risk.  These insights will 
allow them to make sound policy recommendations that will positively influence 
maintainability, supportability and finally Ao, readiness risk, and total LCC.  In 
addition, the adopted models and the developed methodology of this report 
provide program managers and contracting officers the ability to ascertain if a 
maintenance and logistics support proposal being put forth by a potential 
contractor is truly in the best interest of the government.  It will also ensure that a 
cost effective and reliable weapon system is available for the warfighter. 
Another significant aspect of this report is that the adopted models and the 
developed methodology are not limited to a specific weapon system.  By making 
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minor changes to the model (system components, etc.), and assuming data can 
be retrieved, they may be applied to many weapon systems currently in use 
throughout the DoD, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
Vehicle, and aircraft such as the F-22 or F-35. 
B. OVERVIEW 
The plethora of LAV-25 components, namely over 1,500, would make 
research on all cross-possible scenarios in conjunction with the input factors 
impractical and timeless.  A good solution was to limit the research to a limited 
number of parts, especially those that are the most costly to procure or repair, 
and are considered “critical” (if a failure occurs, the LAV is non-operational).  This 
report concentrated on five major critical components, which represents sixty five 
percent of the total cost of replacement parts currently maintained by the USMC 
for the LAV-25. 
The simulation modeling was a combination of Arena and Excel 
spreadsheet software simulations.  These two models have been presented and 
developed by Kang et al. (2009).  Even though the Excel spreadsheet model by 
itself is a simple and useful model for the decision makers (e.g., program 
managers, logistics designers or financial administrators), it is a “static” model, 
which does not take into account the dynamic interference between the Ao’s 
synthetic parameters.  For example, a decrease in MTBF will decrease Ao and 
increase total LCC, because low Ao increases the frequency of repairs and 
induces higher maintenance costs.  Ao is further reduced when these increased 
maintenance costs eventually lead to budget reductions and force a reduction in 
the frequency of preventive maintenance.  This "vicious cycle" continually lowers 
Ao, ultimately leading to high-cost corrective (unscheduled) maintenance, which 
further reduces Ao.  
This report estimated distributions of the average Ao, cumulative Ao, and 
average LCC for 257 scenarios.  Each scenario used predetermined mean factor 
values in accordance with the initial data and assumptions.  Correlating the input 
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data with output results, the authors found which of the input factors had the 
greatest impact on Ao, readiness risk, and total LCC.  The authors then 
examined alternatives (changed the mean value of the factors that had the 
greatest impact) and analyzed the results.  In accordance with the results and 
sensitivity analysis, the authors suggested alternative maintenance policies that 
will achieve the desired impact on maintainability, supportability, Ao, and 
readiness risk.  
The input factors for all scenarios were failure rates of the five 
components that are critical, the number of spares in the spare inventory, the 
echelon maintenance turnaround time (TAT), and the Op-Tempo.  The outputs 
were the operational availability (Ao), the readiness risk, and the LCC.  As a 
reminder, the assumption made by the authors for this project, as described in 
Chapter III, was that LCC was the operation and support cost, including spare, 
repair, transportation and operations costs. 
First, the Baseline Case of this report was developed.  This base case 
model was used to compare the outcomes of all other cases this report 
developed and investigated.  The input data were the failure rates (λi) of the 
components and values with normal distribution for the rest of the input factors 
(number of spares in the spare inventory, TAT, and Op-Tempo).  The authors 
developed a correlation table, as shown in Table 8, to show the relationship 
between the input and outputs of the simulation model.  The correlation table 
shows that the factors that most affected Ao were, in order of precedence, the 
4th echelon TAT, Op-Tempo, number of spares for component 1 (sensor unit, 
laser) in the spare pool, and the number of spares for component 5 (engine, 
diesel) in the spare pool.  All other factors had a minor impact on Ao.  The factors 
 
 
that were most influential for LCC, in order of precedence, were the Op-Tempo 
and failure rate of component 2 (control display unit).  The findings of the 
Baseline Case scenario were the drivers for developing the other cases. 
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The first part of the analysis was Cases One, Two, and Three.  In this part 
the failure rates were retained.  This analysis was applicable for existing 
acquisition arrangements and contracts.  The second part of the analysis was 
Cases Four and Five.  In this part, the failure rates were changed.  This analysis 
was applicable for developing new arrangements and contracts, or modifying the 
existing ones. 
 
Table 10.   Summary of Cases 
In Case One, the input factor of 4th echelon TAT was set to be N(45, 4.5) 
days.  The rest of the factors were identical as the Baseline Case.  There was 
improvement for the mean Ao and the readiness risk.  However, the mean Ao 
remained below the target mean Ao of 0.85.  The mean LCC did not significantly 
change. 
In Case Two, the input factor of 4th echelon TAT was further improved 
and set at N(30, 4.5) days.  There was further improvement for Ao and readiness 
risk.  However, the mean Ao still remained below the target mean Ao.  The mean 
LCC did not significantly change. 
Case Three was divided in two sub-cases.  For both sub-cases, the input 
factor of 4th echelon TAT was set as in Case Two (N(30, 4.5) days).  For the one 
sub-case, the input factor of number of spares in the spare inventory for 
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component 1 (sensor unit, laser) was increased.  For the other sub-case, the 
input factor of number of spares in the spare inventory for component 5 (engine, 
diesel) was increased.  For sub-case (i), when the spare 1 inventory increased, 
the mean Ao was improved above the target mean Ao.  Furthermore, there was 
noteworthy improvement in readiness risk.  The mean LCC was slightly 
increased.  Therefore, for developing the next case the change in number of 
spares for component 1 was used. 
Case four used the same input data as the baseline case, except the 
failure rates.  Three distinct sub-cases were created.  In the sub-cases one and 
two, the mean failure rate of component 1 (sensor unit, laser) was improved from 
λ=0.005 to λ=0.0033 and λ=0.0025, respectively.  In the third sub-case, the 
failure rates of all five components were changed to λ=0.0025.  For all sub-cases 
there was improvement for mean Ao and readiness risk, but below the threshold 
and the target mean Ao.  The LCC was incrementally reduced from sub-case one 
to sub-case three. 
Case Five was a combination of Cases Three and Four.  The input factor 
of 4th echelon TAT was set as in Case Three (N(30, 4.5) days).  Then, three sub-
cases were created.  Each sub-case used the failure rates of the respective sub-
cases as in Case Four.  The mean Ao and readiness risk were significantly 
improved, well above the threshold and target mean Ao.  The LCC was 
incrementally reduced. 
C. CONCLUSION 
1.  The turnaround time (TAT) has the biggest impact on Ao and 
readiness risk. 
The decision makers and the warfighters should focus on how to improve 
this factor.  
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2.  Keeping only a large spare inventory, without improvement in 
TAT, does not have a significant impact on Ao and readiness risk 
improvement.  Furthermore, it only increases the LCC. 
The research demonstrated that by increasing only the number of spares 
in the spare inventory there is almost no change in readiness risk.  A combination 
of a reduced TAT with an increased number of spares in the spare inventory 
gives further improved results for the readiness risk. 
3.  A combination of TAT improvement and reduced failure rates in 
critical components has a significant positive impact; namely, significant 
Ao and readiness risk improvement, and at the same time, LCC reduction. 
The report indicates that if there is improvement in the Ao, simultaneously 
there is a contribution into the reduction of LCC. 
4.  PBL seems to be a sound approach.  The origin of problems in 
PBL arrangements are not intrinsic but from inappropriate implementation. 
The simulation model that this report adopted and the methodology that 
was developed can be utilized as a guide to negotiate better performance for 
acquisition.  It can assist trade-off decisions between performance and TOC.  
The savings from LCC in terms of dollars would help determine the breakeven 
point for procuring components with decreased failure rates.  The acquisition 
team could negotiate a maximum threshold for the components’ failure rates, 
taking into account the saving in O&S cost.  Cases Four and Five indicate the 
methodology that the acquisition officials and decision maker may follow.  Many 
other setups (cases) can be created and examined in order to come to a sound 
decision. 
5.  Consideration should be given to PBL implementation.  There are 
strong indicators that PBL is better when implemented in subsystems or 
component levels. 
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The sources that this report reviewed indicated that both the DoD and 
private industry incurred better results when implementing PBL in a subsystem or 
component level.  Modeling and simulation can assist the decision maker and the 
warfighter to make assessments on the entire system.  Appropriate metrics are of 
significant importance for developing simulation models and evaluating 
outcomes. 
D. IMPLICATIONS  
Turnaround time is the most significant factor affecting operational 
availability, readiness risk, and life cycle cost.  Funding only for spare inventory is 
not the optimal allocation of tax dollars; reducing TAT by improving 
maintainability and supportability (the two components of TAT) will result in the 
need for retaining a smaller spare inventory.  Furthermore, trying to enhance only 
the MTBF of a system or subsystem will not by itself produce the desired 
outcome for increased Ao and reduced total LCC.  A combination with TAT 
improvement would multiply the outcome benefits in terms of increased Ao, 
reduced readiness risk, and reduced total LCC. 
1. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics 
Pursuing improvement in TAT should be a key focus in the policy and 
directions regarding all systems, regardless of their point in the acquisition life 
cycle.  The appropriate mix of TAT and MTBF is the task of acquisition managers 
and decision makers. 
PBL is indeed directed for implementation.  However, it is not directed to 
be implemented in the subsystem or component level, as this research indicated 
would result in optimum outcomes.  Furthermore, tools such as modeling and 




The above should be investigated and incorporated in the DoD’s policies.  
USD (AT&L) is the overarching authority.  USD (AT&L) and the respective 
agencies have the responsibility for overseeing the implementation of policies 
and directions they have issued.  USD (AT&L) should ensure the proper 
communication between the acquisition and logistics communities.  Oversight 
and communication would diminish the possibility of issuing policies that are not 
being practiced.  The title of the USD (AT&L), by itself, depicts the importance of 
close collaboration between acquisition, technology, and logistics. 
2. Acquisition Managers / Decision Makers (Agencies, Boards, 
PMs) 
Management should take into account the life cycle management and total 
LCC.  Focusing only on the procurement cost will not result in the best return on 
the invested funds.  The sustainment cost (operation and support) is 60%–80% 
of the total ownership cost (Naegle, 2008).  For DoD objectives, many times 
performance is the primary criterion rather than cost.  Managers are called to 
decide for trade-offs between the available funds and the desired performance. 
Outcomes in terms of Ao, readiness risk, and total LCC would be 
staggeringly improved by investing mainly in TAT.  Secondarily, determining the 
appropriate level of failure rates and spare inventory would further augment 
outcomes.  The model adopted by Kang et al. in this report and the developed 
methodology provides managers and decision makers a tool that is flexible and 
applicable throughout all phases of the acquisition life cycle.  In addition, such 
tools can be easily used when the desired outcomes change.  Also, they are 
easily understood, and thus easy to implement for all stakeholders and mainly 
the warfighters.  They are applicable to all systems; in the development phase, 




Performance-based logistics is the DoD’s preferred acquisition 
arrangement.  Whether to follow PBL, and what is the proper implementation in 
order to achieve optimum results, is the responsibility of acquisition managers.  
They should consider pursuing PBL implementation in a subsystem or 
component level.  Managers, except the accurate requirements that should be 
requested from the user, should define and decide on measures and metrics 
related to the desired outcomes.  Close teamwork with the user is required in 
order to monitor changes and refine the acquisition strategy and/or life cycle 
acquisition management.  The use of M&S is connecting all subsystems, and 
illustrates the effect of decisions in the system as a totality.  Business case 
analysis can be supported with the model adopted as part of this project or a 
similar tool. 
3. Contracting Officers 
The use of M&S will help contracting officers have a clear picture as to 
what extent the desired outcomes can be achieved.  This will help contracting 
officers to create and use the appropriate contracting vehicles, mitigating the risk 
for the government.  The use of M&S during negotiations provides them with 
solutions to different offered alternatives.  Such models can also assist 
contracting officers in developing the right incentives for contractors to perform 
beyond the required objectives, especially for PBL arrangements. 
Performance-based logistics and the shift from buying spares to buying 
performance drastically change the way a contracting officer should think and 
act.  The workload for the contracting officers increases, as they have to oversee 
contractor performance during the life cycle of the system.  Contracting officers 
need to develop a plan and methodology for measuring performance against 
predefined standards.  Proper metrics tied to the desired outcomes and suitable 
tools, such as the model this project adopted, can reduce workload.  Additionally, 
PBL requires knowledge from contracting officers that is beyond their expertise.  
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Hence, closer collaboration and coordination with maintenance and logistics 
specialists is essential for successful contract management of the system. 
4. Maintenance and Logistics Managers 
The improvement of turnaround time is mainly the responsibility of 
maintenance and logistics managers.  They should provide areas with a potential 
for improvement and the respective methods that will result in ameliorate 
outcomes.  Particularly, the logistics community develops and uses more M&S 
tools than every other specialty.  The critical role that M&S can play in acquisition 
management, which this project illustrated, reveals the necessity for closer 
cooperation between the acquisition, maintenance, and logistic communities.  
This will increase the workload and responsibilities of all involved maintenance 
and logistics managers.  However, the development of M&S tools with the 
contribution of all the concerned parties will lead to a more realistic approach of 
the model and simulation results of better quality.  An increase in workload also 
stems from the continuous monitoring of requirements and processes that is 
necessary for updating and adjusting tools and methods. 
Regarding PBL, maintenance and logistics management is not following 
traditional approaches.  Accordingly, a paradigm shift in maintenance and 
logistics ways of management is required; manage performance and desired 
objectives rather than how to achieve them.  Maintenance and logistics 
managers should contribute with their expertise in the development of the 
appropriate metrics. 
5. Warfighter 
Modeling and simulation can assist the warfighter to find the Ao and 
readiness risk for the level of sources currently available.  The model this project 
adopted and the developed methodology will help USMC to determine the Ao 
and readiness risk that is achievable with the available spare pool, the existing 
failure rates, maintenance times, and logistics delay times.  The degree of 
accuracy of inputs used in M&S tools determines the quality of the results.  
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Therefore, warfighters need to determine and provide with certainty their 
operational requirements (mean Ao and readiness risk) and update them as 
necessary.  Close and uninterrupted cooperation with acquisition and logistics 
personnel is required to develop and adjust the appropriate M&S tools and 
performance metrics.  This is a requisite especially for PBL.  M&S can also help 
the warfighter to understand the scarcity and limitations of resources (funds, 
spares, personnel, maintenance times, logistics capabilities, etc.) and the impact 
on operational availability, consequently in operations, of proficient management. 
6. Taxpayers 
The methodology and tools indicated in this report may assist in the 
avoidance of cost overruns paid by the taxpayers for the public goods of national 
security and national defense, because of poor performance and ambiguous 
metrics.  Proper use and implementation of acquisition tools and methods would 
result in improved performance and decreased total LCC. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  The DoD should further research the impact that TAT has on Ao, 
readiness risk, and total LCC.  The Dod should investigate alternatives for 
improving TAT. 
2.  The DoD should develop case studies for other major weapon systems 
and compare findings.  Use of more realistic data that this project was able to 
collect is recommended. 
3.  The DoD should consider PBL implementation in a subsystem or 
component level and mandate the use of Ao and readiness risk as performance 
measures.  They should also provide initiatives for developing any other metric 
appropriate for each individual case and tied to the desired outcomes. 
4.  The USD (AT&L) should issue directives for focus on TAT and 
mandate the use of M&S tools for use in life cycle management.  Finally, they  
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should enhance collaboration and coordination between acquisition and logistics 
communities, as well as investigate the potential of an integrated team managing 
the system throughout its entire life cycle. 
5.  The USD (AT&L) should examine what paradigm shift in the 
organizational behavior of agencies is needed in order to implement PBL, how it 
can be accomplished, and provide appropriate training.  Training should be 
common for all different specialists: acquisition, maintenance, logistics, and 
warfighters. 
6.  Acquisition, maintenance, and logistics managers should cooperate 
more closely in the development of M&S and the appropriate metrics.  They 
should also collaborate and coordinate in developing and implementing PBL 
arrangements. 
7.  Warfighters should use M&S tools for setting goals that are achievable 
with the available resources.  Alternatively, they should use M&S tools to set the 
resources requirements for achieving desired objectives.  They should provide 
acquisition, maintenance, and logistics managers with accurate and updated 
demands and objectives. 
8.  The USMC should use the model adopted and the developed 
methodology in this project in order to improve Ao and readiness risk.  They 
should investigate methods to improve TAT in the fourth echelon of maintenance.  
Lastly, they should consider PBL contracts for the support of LAVs with the five 
critical components selected for this project’s case study. 
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APPENDIX:  LAV-25 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A. PROGRAM HISTORY 
The concept of the light armored vehicle (LAV) was first vetted by the 
United States military services in the late 1970s.  At the time, military strategists 
were devising ways in which to employ highly mobile and rapidly deployable 
forces vice large entrenched units primarily to deal with the emerging threat 
posed by the Middle East.  Initially, the United States Army led the way in LAV 
concept development and research, but eventually determined that deploying 
forces utilizing LAVs was not in its best interests.  At the same time, the United 
States Marine Corps, always tasked with deploying its forces rapidly, was 
searching for a means by which to enhance the mobility, lethality, and firepower 
of its units.  They saw possible benefits of the LAV and under the leadership of 
Commandant Al Gray, obtained specially allocated funds from Congress and 
began the preparations for procurement and testing of LAVs being built by GM 
Defense Systems in Canada and fielded by the Canadian Armed Forces.  
In the early 1980s, testing of numerous LAV-Grizzlies on loan from the 
Canadian military began at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 
Palms, California.  The testing proved successful and the Marine Corps 
determined that that the LAV met all the requirements it needed, and in 
September of 1982, a production contract was approved with GM Defense 
Systems, Canada for the production of the LAV in six different models: anti-tank, 
mortar, 25mm, logistics, maintenance and recovery, and command and control. 
The first LAVs were deployed in July 1985 to the 2nd LAV Battalion, Camp 
Lejuene, NC, followed closely by deployments to the 1st LAV Battalion, Camp 
Pendleton, CA and the 3rd LAV Battalion, 29 Palms, CA.  Since its inception, the 




wartime, natural disasters, and civil peacekeeping missions including Panama, 
Kuwait, Iraqi, Afghanistan, and following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. 
As the LAV continues to prove its worth, the Marine Corps plans to extend 
its useful life beyond the year 2015, and the United States Army, in a reversal of 
initial findings, is now fielding the LAV in highly mobile units known as Stryker 
Brigade Combat Teams. 
B. CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTIONS 
The basic LAV fielded by the Marine Corps is the LAV-25, an 8x8 
wheeled, lightly armored combat vehicle.  Expanding on this basic model, the 
Marine Corps has created its Family of Light Armored Vehicles (FOLAV) 
consisting of LAVs available in the following six different configurations: 
 LAV-AT (Anti-tank-TOW missile system) 
 LAV-C2 (Command and Control)  
 LAV-R (Recovery) 
 LAV-LOG (Logistics) 
 LAV-M (Mortar)  
 LAV-MEWSS (Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System) 
The workhorse of the Marine Corps LAV fleet, and the focus of this 




Figure 38.   LAV-25 (From: Olive-Drab, n.d.) 
 
The LAV-25 consists of a M242-25mm chain gun; it is designed to operate 
in all terrains and in all weather conditions, and includes night vision capabilities.  
When necessary, the LAV-25 can be configured to operate amphibiously within 3 
minutes.  The LAV-25 can be transported by air utilizing a CH-53 E, C-141, C-
130, or C-5, and cost approximately $900,000.  
Multiple sources on the Internet are available for information on LAVs, 
such as the following: 
 http://www2.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/Pages/default.aspx (The Head 
Quarters Marine Corps Web site)  
 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/index.html  
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